Προμηθεύς

journal of philosophy

2020
N. 34
September
December

issn: 2176-5960

EXILE AND COSMOPOLITANISM IN PLUTARCH'S POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

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ABSRACT: The aim of this paper is to focus on Plutarch's view on cosmopolitanism which emerges from his treatise *De exilio*, an emblematic writing, as it allows recognizing that in Plutarch cosmopolitanism is not a merely political issue, but rather it reflects ethical and metaphysical concerns.

KEYWORDS: Plutarch. Cosmopolitism. *De exilio*.

Plutarch plays a distinctive role within Greek universalism in the Hellenistic age, as he has dealt with the theme of cosmopolitanism in numerous writings of a different nature (historical, philosophical, political and literary) and animated by multiple purposes.

The aim of this paper is to focus on Plutarch's view on cosmopolitanism which emerges from his treatise *De exilio*[1], an emblematic writing, as it allows recognizing that in Plutarch cosmopolitanism is not a merely political issue, but rather it reflects ethical and metaphysical concerns.

Firstly, I will be focusing on the close relationship between politics and philosophy according to Plutarch, identifying his elaboration of the concepts of citizen and foreigner. Then the contents of Plutarch's *De exilio* will be presented, dwelling on the elements that can be acknowledged as distinctive of Plutarch's philosophical position[2], and on those that can be traced back to the ancient consolatory tradition.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY

In Plutarch's political view, the union between knowledge and power dominates and the Greek/Barbarian relationship is also described as that between virtue and fortune. In his speeches *De Alexandri fortuna aut virtute* Plutarch portrays Alexander as virtue incarnate[3]. The struggle between Greeks and Barbarians may be described as the contest between Virtue and Fortune, Fortune being on the side of the Barbarians, who, in turn, oppose Alexander. The author argues with great rhetorical emphasis that it was philosophy that provided Alexander with the "equipment with which he carried out his campaign":

> τίς γὰρ ἀπὸ μειζόνων ἢ καλλιόνων ἀφορμῶν ἀνήγετο μεγαλοψυχίας, συνέσεως, σωφροσύνης, ἀνδραγαθίας, αἷς αὐτὸν ἐφωδίαζε φιλοσοφία πρὸς τὴν στρατείαν;

[1] See especially OPSOMER 2002, pp. 281-295; *Idem* 1998; *Idem* 2005, pp. 161–200; *Idem* 2007, pp. 281–310. VAMVOURI RUFFY 2017, pp. 237-246. VOLPE CACCIATORE 2017, pp. 107-116; *Eadem* 2017, pp. 247-254.

[2] On Middle Platonism see: Dillon 1996; Bonazzi, Donini, Ferrari 2015; Vimercati 2015; Bonazzi 2015; Boys-Stones2018.

[3] VAN RAALTE 2004, pp. 75-112.

> For who was ever better fitted than he for splendid enterprises; with all the choicest and most excelling precepts of magnanimity, consideration, wisdom, and virtuous fortitude, with which a philosophical education largely supplied him for his expedition? (Tr. Goodwin)
>
> Plutarch, *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute*, 1.4, 327E

After historical-political changes, Plutarch clearly shifts from the Greek/Barbarian polarity to one which opposes Greeks to Romans[4]. It is particularly interesting to evaluate the position of Plutarch because, although well disposed, interested and favourable to the Roman Empire, he still considers Rome and Greece as two distinct nations[5]. In the *Praecepta*, we find some behavioural advice that can be applied to the members of the Greek ruling class who intend to occupy a prominent role in their cities at the end of the first century AD, under Roman rule. Plutarch considers himself able to give precepts since he possesses philosophical knowledge and shares with his interlocutors via *eugèneia*, nobility of birth. This emphasis on the union between knowledge and power has a Platonic background, but, while Platonic philosophers are, we may say, "forced" to govern, although they would prefer to devote themselves to the pleasures of pure knowledge, the Plutarchian notables regard themselves as destined *by nature* to administering the city[6]. According to Plutarch, the task of philosophy is to give practical suggestions (*Praecepta*, 798B), so in the case of Plutarch we should talk, with Van Hoof, about *Practical Ethics*, in which "both the aims and the strategies of philosophy are being adapted to meet the specific requirements of the Greek and Roman elite of the Early Empire"[7]. Plutarch wants us to adopt a more pragmatic conception of philosophy[8]. To be sure, Plutarch shares with Plato the high value attached to education; however, unlike Plato, he does not endorse an objective concept of justice. This is evident if we consider his general approval of the use of rhetoric to convince people and his belief that deeds (representing common notions of virtue and justice) are better than

[4] See Plutarch, *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae.*

[5] See GASTALDI 2017, pp. 159-179, here pp. 159-160; SWAIN 1996, pp. 137 ss.

[6] See GASTALDI 2017, p. 179.

[7] See VAN HOOF 2014, pp. 135-148, here p. 145. Discipline and self-control, for example, are among the characteristics that politicians and philosophers have in common. See VAN RAALTE 2005, pp. 75–112.

[8] For example both politician and philosopher has self-restraint. See VAN RAALTE 2005, pp. 75–112.

words. For philosophical discourse, as Plutarch writes, does not sculpt immobile statues, but makes all that it touches active and alive[9].

The coincidence between philosophy and politics can be emblematically represented by referring to the famous episode in which Diogenes the Cynic, when asked how to take stand against an enemy, is said to have answered: "by proving yourself a man of virtue". Significantly, Plutarch describes Diogenes' assertion as of great philosophical—as well as political—value[10].

The different realities he presented (Greek vs. Barbarian; Greek vs. Roman), the different situations (rulers and ruled), since expressing distinctive polarities, require the key role of *logos* to coexist peacefully. Indeed, in Plutarch, *logos* is both the element of unity and the element of distinction among different peoples. But there is also another position that enabled him to adopt this all-encompassing perspective: the great value he ascribes to the concept of tradition, even in the case of the Barbaric traditions from which he tries to draw a Platonic image of truth. Such a value attributed to the tradition is typical of Stoicism, who firstly propounded a theory about the nature of traditions[11], but Plutarch enriches it with a completely Platonic perspective and justification[12].

COSMOPOLITANISM IN PLUTARCH'S *DE EXILIO*

Let us move on to an outline of the main aspects of cosmopolitanism in Plutarch's *De exilio*. This treatise is a consolation speech addressed to a young man exiled from Sardis[13]. He invites the man to reconsider the idea of homeland and encourages him to feel at home everywhere. According to Plutarch, exile is the imaginary outcome of an opinion, *doxa*, (599F) since our homeland is the world (600E-602D). Furthermore, exile is an opportunity to accomplish remarkable deeds and lead a quiet life. Also in other writings, such as in *Peri euthymia*, Plutarch specifies that there are events that produce pain by their very nature, but exile is not one of them[14].

[9] Plutarch, *Maxime cum principibus* 776c-d. Plutarch takes up and adapts a verse of Pindar's *Nemea* 5,1.
[10] Plutarch, *De capienda ex inimicis utilitate*, 88B. See VAN RAALTE 2004, p. 112.
[11] See BOYS-STONES 2001, pp. V-VIII.
[12] This position is evident, among other writings, in the treatise *De Iside et Osiride*. See DE SIMONE 2016, especially pp. 66-70; 81-83; 89-91; 121-122; 127-131.
[13] Most likely the same addressee of his political precepts in *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*.
[14] See Plutarch, *Peri euthymia* 17, and the famous Stoic dogma: "no one is a slave by nature" (SVF III 352). See VOLPE CACCIATORE 2017, pp. 108-110.

He has Socrates say (600F) that he was *no Athenian or Greek, but a citizen of the world*[15], thus portraying Socrates in a completely different fashion from Plato's *Apology* where he refuses to suggest exile as his own punishment (*Apology* 37c-e)[16].

Plutarch questions the myth of autochthony (604D-E) which in Athens was anchored to a specific political and cultural context, presenting Athens instead as a cosmopolitan place and not just as a place of the privileged autochthonous Athenians. Then he discusses Theseus, the hero who, despite his departure from the Attica, was not forgotten and whose monument was still worshipped (607A). Therefore he challenges preconceived ideas linked to the notion of homeland and exile by questioning the Athenian foundation myths, in a sort of political revisionism[17].

At the end of the treatise (607A-607F), he declares that we are all exiled from the sky and our virtue along with our wisdom cannot be changed by any earthly location. The wise man "who feeds on philosophy" can live and be happy anywhere. To the wise man, the world is open, without any borders or limits[18].

In his conclusion, Plutarch again explicitly refers to Plato's doctrine that our soul is imprisoned within the body, like an oyster in its shell[19].

So far the contents which concern our reflection in the text.

THE METHAPHISICAL PERSPECTIVE OF A NATURE-BASED COSMOPOLITANISM

[15] This sentence is most likely a quotation from Epictetus 1.91. See Seneca, *Ad Helviam* 11.7; Cicero, *Tuscolanae* 5.37.108. According to Maria Vamvouri Ruffy, *De exilio* is the only Plutarchus' treatise where the term *kosmios* means citizen of the world. But it is not surprising since also regarding a notion as xenos is not possible to find a single notion (See Volpe 2017). In the majority of the term's occurrences, we can distinguish between discursive statements, prescriptive statements, and reflective statements which illustrate its meaning.

[16] The reasons of Socrates' position are explained in *Crito* 52 b-c, as well as in *Apology* 37 c-e.

[17] See VAMVOURI RUFFY 2017, pp. 242-244; WHITMARSH 2001.

[18] See VAMVOURI RUFFY 2017, pp. 237-238.

[19] See Plato, *Phaedrus* 250b-c. κάλλος δὲ τότ᾽ ἦν ἰδεῖν λαμπρόν, ὅτε […]ἐτελοῦντο τῶν τελετῶν ἣν θέμις λέγειν [250ξ] μακαριωτάτην, ἣν ὠργιάζομεν ὁλόκληροι μὲν αὐτοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀπαθεῖς κακῶν ὅσα ἡμᾶς ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὑπέμενεν, ὁλόκληρα δὲ καὶ ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀτρεμῆ καὶ εὐδαίμονα φάσματα μυούμενοί τε καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ, **καθαροὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου ὃ νῦν δὴ σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι**. But at that former time they saw beauty shining in brightness, when […] we were initiated into that which is rightly called the most blessed of mysteries, which we celebrated in a state of perfection, when we were without experience of the evils which awaited us in the time to come, being permitted as initiates to the sight of perfect and simple and calm and happy apparitions, which we saw in the pure light, **being ourselves pure and not entombed in this which we carry about with us and call the body, in which we are imprisoned like an oyster in its shell**.

As Opsomer has pointed out[20], much of the material in *On Exile* is traditional, and ultimately derives from Stoic and Cynic literature on the topic, but it is possible to recognise what is distinctive of Plutarch's position. To begin with, Stoic cosmopolitanism should not be understood as a primarily political ideal, but rather as an ethical one and, Opsomer adds, one inspired by a specific Stoic theological perspective.
The first point on which I would like to focus is that the natural world is only in appearance the starting point of Plutarch's philosophical reflection (599D-600E), but he immediately gives nature an ontological, epistemological and anthropological dimension: according to him, homeland is a construction, the outcome of an opinion, *doxa* (599F). Finding oneself in a particular place is of no importance, what is important, instead, is our relationship to that place (601F). All a man is meant to do is to look up to the sky and contemplate the endless ether that surrounds the earth, this is the boundary of our native land, and there *no one is either exiled, or foreigner, or alien* (601A)[21].

> Hence is that saying of Hercules: "[…] In Greece my country's every city". But Socrates expressed it better, when he said, **he was not an Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the world** (οὐκ Ἀθηναῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, ἀλλὰ "Κόσμιος). […] "Behold how yonder azure sky, / Extending vastly wide and high / To infinitely distant spaces, / In her soft arms our earth embraces". **These are the boundaries of our country, and no man is an exile or a stranger or foreigner in these** (οὗτοι τῆς πατρίδος ἡμῶν ὅροι εἰσί, καὶ οὐδεὶς οὔτε φυγὰς ἐν τούτοις οὔτε ξένος οὔτ᾽ ἀλλοδαπός). (Tr. Goodwin)[22]

Therefore, the sky and the infinitely distant places are the boundaries of our country, but Plutarch gives to this belonging also an anthropological and political value. In fact he keeps saying that, as a consequence, we are all citizens of the same community, following the same laws and the same ruler, *id est* God.

> […] where there is the same fire, water, air, the same rulers, administrators, and presidents, the same sun, moon, and daystar; where there are the same laws to all, […] where there is one king and supreme ruler, which is "God, who comprehends the beginning, the

[20] See OPSOMER 2002, p. 281.
[21] See VAMVOURI RUFFY 2017, pp. 244-245.
[22] Plutarch, *De exilio*, 600F-601A: ὅθεν εὖ μὲν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς εἶπεν […] ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης βέλτιον, οὐκ Ἀθηναῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, ἀλλὰ "Κόσμιος" εἶναι φήσας […] οὗτοι τῆς πατρίδος ἡμῶν ὅροι εἰσί, καὶ οὐδεὶς οὔτε φυγὰς ἐν τούτοις οὔτε ξένος οὔτ᾽ ἀλλοδαπός.

> middle, and end of the universe; who passes through all things in a straight course, compassing all things according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν): justice follows him to take vengeance on those that transgress the divine law" [Plato, *Laws* 715E-716A], which justice we naturally (φύσει) all make use of towards all men, as being citizens of the same community (χρώμεθα πάντες ἄνθρωποι φύσει πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ πολίτας). (Tr. Goodwin)[23]

Here we can recognise Plutarch's distinctive form of Stoicism, or better, quoting Brenk[24], his touch of Stoicism. Plutarch, in fact, shows his Platonic conviction that metaphysical principles and causes are at the very basis of physical being[25] and the cosmos is living and divine—although inferior to the transcendental god, quoting the very Platonic sentences from *Laws* (715E-716A), and from *Timaeus* (90a). Plutarch, in fact, claiming that the true homeland of a man and of his soul is the sky, uses the platonic image according to which man is not an earthly or immobile plant, but points to heaven: the head like a root keeps the body erect and points to heaven 600F.

> ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, ᾗ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, **'φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον'** οὐδ' ἀκίνητον **'ἀλλ' οὐράνιόν'** ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ῥίζης τὸ σῶμα τῆς κεφαλῆς ὀρθὸν ἱστάσης, πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνεστραμμένον.
>
> For man (as Plato says [*Timaeus* 90a]) is not an earthly and unmovable, but a heavenly plant, the head raising the body erect as from a root, and directed upwards toward heaven.[26]

For both Plato and Plutarch plants are suspended with the higher parts up and the lower parts down, Plato explaining that in the higher part there is the rational and divine part of the soul[27]. This image summarizes Plutarch's philosophical and political position: as a result of the new political situation, Plutarch cannot confine himself to a specific geographical and cultural belonging, Stoicism has given him the physical presuppositions of cosmopolitanism, Platonism instead has provided a metaphysical

[23] Plutarch, *De exilio*, 601A-B: ὅπου ταὐτὸ πῦρ ὕδωρ ἀήρ, ἄρχοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ διοικηταὶ καὶ πρυτάνεις, ἥλιος σελήνη φωσφόρος: οἱ αὐτοὶ νόμοι πᾶσι, ὑφ' ἑνὸς προστάγματος καὶ μιᾶς ἡγεμονίας τροπαὶ βόρειοι τροπαὶ νότιοι ἰσημερίαι Πλειὰς Ἀρκτοῦρος, ὧραι σπόρων ὧραι φυτειῶν: εἷς δὲ βασιλεὺς; καὶ ἄρχων 'θεὸς ἀρχήν τε καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχων τοῦ παντός, εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος: τῷ δ' ἕπεται Δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός,' χρώμεθα πάντες ἄνθρωποι φύσει πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ πολίτας.

[24] See BRENK 1999, p. 232.

[25] See FERRARI 1995, p. 21.

[26] Plutarch, *De exilio*, 600F. The comparison with plants aimed at those who complain of exile is also present in Epictetus 3, 24, 8 e 12 e 36.

[27] For a complete analysis of this metaphor in the *Timaeus* see: GATTI 2015, pp. 111-118.

depth whose consequences are exclusively ethical. Without the Platonic ontology, *id est*, in this case, to be bound to the heavenly and divine part, it is impossible to face the exile. Plutarch does not condemn taking roots in a specific place *tout court* as he himself was attached to Chaeronea[28], to his role, to his social and cultural position, but he is facing the new reality of the Roman Empire and philosophy is giving him the intellectual categories to "live the chains" as a free man.

According to Plutarch, "indeed some one country is found to be more agreeable to a plant than another, in which it thrives and flourishes better; but no place can deprive a man from his happiness, no more than of his virtue and prudence"[29]. This remark that place is indifferent with respect to happiness, is a Stoic *topos* of the genre. But the image from Plato's *Timaeus* adds a new, transcendent, dimension to the Stoic idea of the cosmic city[30]. Only the wise man who does not let his passions or excessiveness dominate him can live anywhere and be a cosmopolitan person. In fact, also in *Timaeus* (91e-92a) Plato contrast the metaphor of the celestial plants with the image of men having their heads and bodies bent down, guided by the part of the soul present in the chest, as attracted by their *suggeneia* with the earth itself. So every man can undergo either a *theomorphosis* or a *theriomorphosis*[31]. This example also implies a distinction between *nous* and *doxa* from both a gnoseological and an ontological point of view. This is the distinction from which Plutarch started when he considered exile to be *the outcome of an opinion*. Therefore, nature is not enough; nature gives human beings the possibility not to be an exiled, a foreigner, or an alien, but only the wise man can recognise this.

Philosophy meets the historical reality of the Roman Empire, which is, in its own manner, a kind of cosmopolitan world. Yet this model is not restricted to an intellectual elite, to those who have a philosophical way of living, but, according to the Platonic perspective that Plutarch adopts, only this kind of people cannot feel themselves exiled, strangers or aliens.

In his conclusion Plutarch's position is that as mortal human beings, we are all exiled, since our souls belong in the higher world and will return to it after our deaths.

[28] See VAMVOURI RUFFY 2017, p. 245.

[29] Plutarch, *De exilio*, 607EF: καίτοι φυτῷ μὲν ἔστι τις χώρα μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἑτέρα πρόσφορος, ἐν ᾗ τρέφεται καὶ βλαστάνει βέλτιον: ἀνθρώπου δ᾽οὐδεὶς ἀφαιρεῖται τόπος εὐδαιμονίαν, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ἀρετὴν οὐδὲ φρόνησιν.

[30] See OPSOMER 2002.

[31] Ivi, p. 117.

Until the soul is imprisoned within the body ("like a an oyster in its shell", Plato, *Phaedrus* 250b-c), it is exiled. This eschatological perspective redeems cosmopolitanism and transcends Stoicism[32], in this way Plutarch has personalised the traditional genre of consolation for an exile: from an earthly perspective we all are exiled form heaven and therefore citizens of the entire world.

PLUTARCH'S UNIVERSALISM AND THE CONSOLATORY TRADITION

We have recognized in Plutarch the coexistence of two different philosophical positions: the Platonic and the Stoic one. In fact, Plutarch's —as well as that of other Middle Platonists— thought system has been defined as eclectic; however, as many scholars have shown[33], the label 'eclecticism' can hardly be appropriate and should thus not be used indiscriminately to account for the complexity and polyphony of Middle Platonism.

Plutarch's thought, I contend, could be more aptly defined as universal, in its acceptation as 'multi-cultural': it is not exclusively Greek and not exclusively philosophical. This aspect of Plutarch's production is a result of his intellectual *milieu* and of his education, but also the reverberation of the cosmopolitanism in which he lived; it is thus something that has a specificity of its own and whose singularity cannot be reduced to 'eclecticism'.

How Plutarch develops the issue of cosmopolitanism, in a writing like his *De exilio*, is an example of the literary *polyeideia*[34] that is commonly attributed to him; Plutarch did not only write in many different literary genres, but also integrated several genres in one text for greater rhetorical effect and clarity. In this case the historical, anthropological and philosophical aspects.

It is, finally, useful to recognise that the arguments produced by Plutarch are traditional, as can be seen by comparing them with other writings on exile, such as those of Teles, Musonius, and Favorinus, Cicero or Seneca's *Ad Helviam* and can be traced

[32] See OPSOMER 2002.

[33] On the inadequacy of the category 'eclecticism' (as well as 'syncretism'), see esp. the account of the history of the use and diffusion of this term in the historiography of the 1700s in DONINI 1982, pp. 10-24 and DONINI 1988, pp. 15-33; HATZMICHALI 2001; BONAZZI-DONINI-FERRARI (eds.) 2015.

[34] See GALLO 2000, p. 11.

back to Crantor[35], a third-century B.C. member of the Academy, widely acknowledged as the first person to write a *consolatio*[36], who thus created a distinct pattern for the Hellenistic tradition of consolation. If, as Cicero told us, the Stoic Panaetius himself recommended to learn Crantor's book by heart[37], then, manifestly, the consolatory tradition and writings naturally evolved into an intricate combination of Stoic and Academic elements, which are at times hard to disentangle[38], as we have seen also in Plutarch.

In this tradition the *Consolatio* addressed to Apollonius for the early death of his son deserves a mention not only since it is ascribed to Plutarch[39], but also and especially because this writing too refers to Plato and the Academy, as well as, to a lesser extent, to Stoicism. Moreover it shares some philosophical characterisations of cosmopolitanism found in Plutarch's *De exilio*.

Ps.Plutarch claims that a correct use of reason, can cure from the grief.

> But the most sovereign remedy against sorrow is our reason, and out of this arsenal we may arm ourselves with defence against all the casualties of life; for every one ought to lay down this as a maxim, that not only is he himself mortal in his nature, but life itself decays, and things are easily changed into quite the contrary to what they are; for our bodies are made up of perishing ingredients. (§ 6, Tr. Goodwin)

Plato's doctrine that the body is a burden and an impediment to the soul and "that on account of the body we can never become wise" are also cited via a long quotation from *Phaedo* 66B-67B (§ 13). Further, with reference to both Crantor and Aristotle, it is said that human life in this world is a punishment and a pain for the soul[40].

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[35] His treatise *On Grief* (Περὶ Πένθους) was written to console his friend Hippocles at the loss of his children and became a model for Greek and Latin consolation traditions. Crantor was a member of Plato's Academy and a student of Xenocrates. See BRANNEN 1948.

[36] By *consolatio* I mean a piece of writing addressed to someone suffering some specific misfortune designed to comfort them with philosophical arguments.

[37] Cicero, *Lucullus*, I 35 *legimus omnes Crantorìs veteris Audemici de luctu; est enim non magnus verum aureolus et ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit ad verbum ediscendus libellus* (*Panaetius*, F 137 van Straaten; cf. Crantor Fr. 1 Mette). See Plutarch, *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 104b.11- 104c. See BOYS-STONES 2013, pp. 123-137; GIGANTE 1980, pp. 9-25; DORANDI 1991; *Idem* 1997, pp. 89-106.

[38] See SETAIOLI 1999, p. 149.

[39] Even if it is considered spurious by some, and a young work by Plutarch by others - here I do not enter into this discussion.

[40] Crantor may have drawn the motif from Aristotle's *Eudemus*.

Furthermore, in this writing we find again the concept found in *De exilio* according to which exile (and consequently pain) is considered to be a *doxa*; ps.Plutarch, quoting Crantore, argues:

> But to mourn excessively and to accumulate grief I do affirm to be altogether unnatural, and to result from a depraved opinion we have of things; therefore we ought to shun it as destructive in itself, and unworthy of a virtuous man.[41] (Tr. Goodwin)

The same concept is summarized also in Cicero who also uses Crantor as a point of reference[42].

The last argument I would like to stress concerns the ethical aspect, and is related to the value of virtue, and to the fact that having a good conscience should lessen our grief; Ps.Plutarch argues that we ought not to abandon ourselves to violent sorrow, beyond temper and the bounds of nature, and again, quoting Crantor, says:

> τὸ γὰρ μὴ δι᾽ αὑτὸν κακῶς πράττειν ὁ μὲν Κράντωρ φησὶν οὐ μικρὸν εἶναι κούφισμα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἂν εἴποιμι φάρμακον ἀλυπίας εἶναι μέγιστον.
>
> Crantor saith, To be innocent is the greatest comfort in afflictions. I assent to him, and affirm that it is the noblest remedy.
>
> Ps.Plutarch, *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 114C. Tr. Goodwin

Also regarding this concept, Cicero more vigorously claims that there is no evil in life except moral guilt[43].

These examples show that in the consolatory tradition and moreover in a writing attributed to Plutarch too we can find the main philosophical characterisations of cosmopolitanism found in Plutarch's *De exilio*, such as the themes objects of *consolationes*, respectively that of exile and that of grief, both seen as a *doxa* or, finally, the notion that we are all exiled from the sky and that, accordingly, our virtue and wisdom cannot be changed by any geographical location. The wise man can live and be happy anywhere. Only the *sapientes* are regarded as capable both of governing and living a life on earth guided by *logos*, and of being self-propelled plants that can

[41] Ps.Plutarch, *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 102D: τὸ δὲ πέρα τοῦ μετρίου παρεκφέρεσθαι χαὶ συναύξειν τὰ πένθη παρὰ φύσιν εἶναί φημι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν φαύλης γίγνεσθαι δόξης. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἐατέον ὡς βλαβερὸν καὶ φαῦλον καὶ σπουδαίοις ἀνδράσιν ἥκιστα πρέπον.

[42] Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.28: *Ex quo intellegitur non in natura sed in opinione esse aegritudinem*. "From this it is understood that distress is not natural but a matter of belief". On Crantor's influence on consolatory tradition see DE SIMONE 2020, pp. 1-15.

[43] Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 13.16: *Videt malum nullum esse nisi culpam*.

flourish everywhere, for they are aware to belong to the sky, so wherever one lives, one can feel at home.

Exile, as suggested by Seneca in his *consolatio*, allows us to focus on the two most important resources we have: nature, which belongs to everyone, and virtue, which is our personal good[44]. Plutarch fully considers these two resources of the Stoic reflection, but has developed them within the elaboration of a "practical" ethics, not separated from a metaphysical horizon of a Platonic imprint.

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[44] See Seneca, *Ad Helviam* 8,2.

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