



## ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A SCEPTICAL *TECHNĒ* IN SEXTUS EMPIRICUS' WORKS

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**ABSTRACT:** Galen (129-216 A.D.) was a prolific writer, mostly important for the development of medicine. However he is not receiving the deserved attention by researchers in Lusophonic world. Here we aim to show why studying Galen's *De Sectis* is useful as an external source for comprehending Sextus Empiricus and his empiricism, as well as his exhortation to live in accordance to the ordinary life. Furthermore, in two appendices (1) we offer the main primary sources, and (2) we display a chronology of the physicians mentioned in pseudo-Galen, *Introd.* 14.683.5-14.684.5.

**KEYWORDS:** *Ancient Medicine; Galen; Pyrrhonism; Sextus Empiricus; Empiricism.*

**RESUMEN:** Galeno (129-216 d.C.) fue un escritor prolífico, extremadamente importante para el desarrollo de la medicina. Sin embargo, no ha recibido por los investigadores de la Lusofonía la atención merecida. Aquí pretendo demostrar por qué estudiar Galeno (*De Sectis*) puede ser útil como fuente externa para comprender Sexto Empírico y su empirismo, así como su exhortación a vivir de acuerdo con la vida común. Además, en los apéndices (1) muestro las principales fuentes primarias y (2) una línea de tiempo de los médico mencionados por pseudo-Galen, *Introd.* 14.683.5-14.684.5.

**PALAVRAS-CLAVE:** *Medicina antiga; Galeno; Pirrónismo; Sexto Empirico; Empirismo.*

**Abbreviations:**

\*Aristotle:

*Met.* = *Metaphysics*

\*Diogenes Laertius

*D.L.* = *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*

\*Galen:

*De Sectis* = *On the Medical Sects for Beginners*

*Lib. Prop.* = *On my own books*

*Med. Exp.* = *On Medical Experience*

*Subf. Emp.* = *An Outline of Empiricism*

\*Sextus Empiricus:

*PH* = *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*

*MI-VI* = *Against the Professors*

*MI* = *Against the Grammarians*

*MII* = *Against the Rhetoricians*

*MV* = *Against the Astrologers*

Born in Pergamus, the philosopher/physician Galen (c. 129 d.C.) was one of the most prominent and influent thinkers who wrote in Greek Language, for he structured the foundations of a medicine which survived about 1500 years. Galen also was a prolific writer with about 150 extant works. His thematic interests were very diverse, since he wrote on history of sciences and of philosophy, logics, epistemology, ethics and metaphysics, as well as, obviously, on medicine, from anatomy to physiology, diagnostics, nosology, therapeutics, pharmacology etc.

In his *De Sectis*, Galen displays the quarrels between the members of the main three medical sects of his time: the Empiricists, the Rationalists and the Methodists. And Galen also displays the epistemic backgrounds and the practical approaches of each sect. Thus, my aim is to use the Galenic presentation of the Empiricist sect (which appears also in *Subf. Empir.* and *Med. Exp.*) to try to illuminate the thoughts of another thinker, Sextus Empiricus, since even if the majority of Sextus' own works have survived, these works lack information on Sextus himself.

Shortly, even if Galen's works deserve a research by themselves, the aim of this research is to use them for piecing together another puzzle: is there some kind of Sceptical *technē* in Sextus Empiricus? And, if yes, what are the implications of it?

With this question in mind, my research has two kinds of results: 1- Greek/Portuguese translations of primary sources (Galen's *De Sectis*<sup>1</sup> and Sextus' *M I-*

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<sup>1</sup> See BRITO (2016a).

VI<sup>2</sup>); 2- papers on the two above mentioned questions<sup>3</sup>. Then I am able to compare the doxography concerning the Empiricist sect of medicine with the methodological steps given by Sextus Empiricus in his approach on knowledge, crafts and ordinary life. Now, to argue for this hypothesis, I would like to start by saying a few words on Galen's *De Sectis*.

As I said above, *De Sectis* displays a quarrel between three medical sects (Empiricists, Rationalists and Methodists), but for illustrating even better the history of this dispute we can also include the account provided by pseudo-Galen's *Introd.* 14.683.5-14.684.5<sup>4</sup>. In this text we read that the disagreements between Rationalists and Empiricists started about III B.C., and by reading Galen's *De Sectis* we notice that these disagreements were alive even 500 years later<sup>5</sup>.

The main issues under discussion were the nature of medical knowledge, i.e.: whether the medicine was a science (*epistēmē*) – which would define it as some kind of theoretical approach – or whether medicine was a craft (*technē*) – which would define it as some kind of practical approach<sup>6</sup> –; consequently, the discussions and disagreements were about how the doctor should behave in diagnosing an illness or prescribing a therapy, according to the nature of the medical knowledge and approach which each sect defends and adheres.

To be sure, from III B.C. to Galen's and Sextus' time the debate became more detailed and the arguments more sophisticated because the sects recurred even more constantly to another very promising field: philosophy, which was also producing its own quarrels, between Sceptics, Stoics, Epicureans, Platonists and Aristotelians, from IV-III B.C. to late-Ancient times. And as well as we see in philosophy the appearance of eclecticism, we see the rise of the same intellectual phenomenon in medicine, as exemplified by Galen himself (see *Lib. Prop.* I).

<sup>2</sup> See BRITO & HUGUENIN (2013); BRITO & HUGUENIN (2015).

<sup>3</sup> See BRITO (2016a); BRITO (2016b); BRITO *et alii* (2017a).

<sup>4</sup> The primary sources which are going to be quoted will appear at the end of this paper (Cf. appendix 1), and whenever I quote them, I am going to offer (a) a "standard" English translation (sometimes with a few modifications), followed by (b) the Greek text and (c) a Portuguese translation by me.

So, cf. appendix 1, passage 1.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. appendix 1, passage 2.

<sup>6</sup> It echoes the discussion mentioned by Aristotle, cf. *Met.* 981a.1-983a.23. Actually, there were discussions on medical topics happening amongst the Peripatetics, since Aristotle's pupil Menon probably is the author of a book on medicine now known as *Anonymus Londinensis*, however, the authorship of this papyrus is still disputed (JONES 1947).

Thus, back to the issue on the utility of using Galen's *De Sectis* for comprehending the Sextan Scepticism, it is necessary to display some problems about this hypothesis and how they can be overcome.

First, primary sources as external cross-references for comprehending the Sextan Scepticism are useful because, since there is a great gap about Sextus himself, by using these primary sources we could shed some light on the impact caused by Sextus' works in his own time, as well as on the philosophical motivations which underlie his writings.

For such, as external primary sources we could use the above mentioned pseudo-Galen's *Introd.*<sup>7</sup>, the *Alexandrian Epitomes of Galen*<sup>8</sup>, or Diogenes Laertius<sup>9</sup>, for these three explicitly mention Sextus Empiricus, unlike Galen.

However, as an unknown author who does not have a large or important literary *corpus*, pseudo-Galen can be very hard or maybe impossible to locate in time, place or philosophical motivation, so it can improve even more our *aporiae* on Sextus' works. On the other hand, being a kind of abstract for medical purposes which was written in Arabic language by the Christian epitomist Hunayn ibn Ishaq (809-873), the *Alexandrian Epitomes of Galen* juxtaposes two sources: 1- Galen's *De Sectis*; 2- pseudo-Galen's *Introd.* And if it was argued that pseudo-Galen is not so useful, again one needs to restrict himself to Galen, the other source used by Hunayn. Finally, there is the doubtful "chronology" displayed by Diogenes Laertius (*D.L.* IX, 116). But the internal literary context of *D.L.* is almost totally dependent on philosophical and biographical data, rarely medical.

But although the three above mentioned sources (i.e.: *Introd.*; *The Alexandrian Epitomes of Galen*; *D. L.* IX, 116) are useless as external sources for comprehending the

<sup>7</sup> Take a look at the appendix 1, passage 1 to read pseudo-Galen mentioning Sextus' name.

<sup>8</sup> Written by Hunayn ibn Ishaq (809-873), *The Alexandrian Epitomes* started by the Arabic epitome of *De Sectis*, but Hunayn – as well as the Alexandrian doctors and translators and epitomists before him and even of his time – could not note or evaluate the authenticity of some primary sources which were used as if they were minor Galenic works, as *Introd.*, for instance. So Hunayn overlaps *De Sectis* and *Introd.* In one only epitome which mentions Sextus: "There are three sects of medicine: first, the sect of Empiricists, whose adherents employ experience alone; second, the sect of Rationalists, whose adherents employ both experience and inference; and, third, the sect of the Methodists, who employ neither experience nor inference. The prominent adherents of the Empiricist sect were Acron of Agrigentum, Philinus of Cos, Serapion of Alexandria, Sextus [Empiricus] (), and Apollonius [Empiricus]." (*The Alexandrian Epitomes of Galen, De Sectis*, 4. WALBRIDGE 2014). On Walbridge's book, see our review: BRITO 2016c. On the range of translations and epitomes written by Hunayn, he himself tells us about it in *Hunayn ibn Ishaq On His Galen Translations* (LAMOREAUX 2016).

<sup>9</sup> See *D.L.* IX, 116.

Sextan Scepticism, they have the specific detail – and yet not fully observed – of mentioning Sextus Empiricus in connection with the Empiricist sect of medicine.

So, these three sources confirm that link between Sextus and the Empiricists, and additionally Galen's *De Sectis* explain how the Empiricists' methodology and approach on epistemology was, and how they figured out their own craft<sup>10</sup>.

Second, now specifically on the links between Sextus Empiricus and the Empiricists, Sextus explicitly reject them, so evidences in the very Sextan works assert that he was not a member of the Empiricist sect (*PH I*, 236-241).

Actually, according to Sextus, because of its philosophical position of non-assenting to some statements, the Methodist sect would be much more closer to the Pyrrhonism than the Empiricist sect, since Empiricists gave assent to some statements on the impossibility of apprehending things which are non-evident. So, the Empiricists are criticized with the same arguments that Sextus displayed against the Academics: while the dogmatists assert that they actually discovered the truth on a particular issue, Academics assert that the truth cannot be discovered at all, the Sceptics keep on searching<sup>11</sup>.

But maybe the criticism made by Sextus towards the Empiricist sect can be much more than an unfathomable puzzle, since we can face the parts of the criticism as elucidatory clues, in this way:

1- Sextus criticizes the Empiricist sect because of its negative dogmatism, this is the very reason why the Empiricists look like Academics, instead of Pyrrhonists. This criticism would not be so problematic if this approximation between the Empiricist sect and the philosophy of the Academics was not some kind of “desertion”, for the Empiricists – since Aenesidemus and the very revival of the Pyrrhonism – developed their arguments in a symbiotic way with the arguments of the Pyrrhonist philosophy.

2- It is precisely because of this symbiotic development with the Empiricist sect that the Pyrrhonic approach on epistemology was misinterpreted as if it was parallel to the Empiricist one, in a moment when the Empiricist doctors were starting to turn to negative dogmatists. This misinterpretation is the reason why Sextus Empiricus

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. appendix 1, passage 3.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. appendix 1, passage 4.

endeavors to establish a dividing line between Pyrrhonists, on the one hand, and Academics and Empiricists, on the other hand.

3- The constant debates between Empiricists and Rationalists lead the first ones to a radical non-theoretical approach on medicine which started to become a self-contradictory obstacle to their own science. Meanwhile, Pyrrhonism kept on developing itself till it turned to one coherent possibility for approaching the philosophy.

4- Even if Sextus was trained as an Empiricist doctor by Menodotus, it is because of his Sceptical behavior that Sextus was able to develop his criticism against his own Empiricist sect. And after following Menodotus as the head of the sect, Sextus could link it more with Pyrrhonism, avoiding the negative dogmatic assertions that his master would have made. It is with this in mind that we should interpret the pseudo-Galen's statement that Sextus lead the Empiricist sect of medicine to perfection, for Sextus gave to it the coherence that it was missing under Menodotus' leadership.

5- As well as Sextus did with the Empiricist sect, he also tried to lead the Pyrrhonists to a more coherent approach on philosophy, linking it with the threefold way by which the Empiricists conceived their medical epistemology<sup>12</sup>.

Now, by the five arguments above we can rebuild the links between the Sceptic attitude and the Empiricist sect, and we can also think them as two kinds of approaches on philosophy and crafts, respectively, that can be performed together and without contradictions. But if I am right in this hypothesis, so the Sextan Scepticism is a kind of therapy, a medicine for the soul, and it would lead us to another issue: on the possibility of prescribing a Sceptic attitude without being or behaving like a dogmatist, i.e. without giving assent to assertive propositions, without intending to claim that the things really are (or really are not) this (or that) way.

This attitude of not claiming, of a non-assertive way of speaking, can be interpreted as an aphasic behavior (*PH I*, 192) and this is the underlying reason why the Sceptics use expressions such as “no more” (*ou mallon*), “maybe” (*tacha*), “possibly”

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. appendix 1, passage 3.

(*exesthi*), “I determine nothing” (*ouden orizō*), making their utterances sound like accounts about how the things appear to them<sup>13</sup>.

So, (1) if the Sceptics do not make utterances compromised with asserting how the things really are (or are not), (2) instead they just utter their own affections, using some *formulae* which reduce the assertive weight of their speeches and (3) linking their discourse with the way they perceive the world (and not aiming to describe the reality by itself), hence a Sceptical approach on medicine should be grounded on a procedure which obeys the clauses (1), (2) and (3).

By reading Galen’s *On the Medical Sects*, we can see that the Empiricist sect was characterized by a procedure grounded on a threefold method: (a) observation/observance (*tērēsis*), (b) self-observation (*autopsia*) and (c) transition to the similar<sup>14</sup>.

On this threefold method, first the doctor should be a very skilled observer, since she/he needs to be attentive to the way people usually deal with diseases, to the way the diseases evolve and how patients are affected by them, and also to the way the diseases and patients are affected by the drugs, surgery and medical intervention (a). Second, the doctor starts to compile her/his own observations, gathering them in a notebook which is going to be useful as a constant reference and consulting material not only for her/himself, but also for others (b). Third, as in practice it is impossible to compile notes on each and every disease, doctors should use colleague’s notebooks, seeking out useful information, and if this procedure does not help, they should compare diseases with diseases, drugs with drugs, looking for those who are similar to others which were never observed before (c).

I think that this threefold Empiricist method does not exclude the Sextan approach on philosophy and crafts, moreover, they can complement each other, i.e. the clauses (1), (2) and (3) can be related to the parts (a), (b) and (c) of the Empiricist method.

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<sup>13</sup> On the Sceptical *phonai*, Sextus dedicates part of the final paragraphs of *PH I* to show how the Sceptical utterances, all with at least one of these *phonai*, are expressions of the Sceptical non assertion (*aphasia*), which is one of the results of the *ataraxia*. These *phonai* have the effect of annihilating the pretention of saying how the things really are (or are not), uttering them, the Sceptic can only relate how the things appear to her/him. Cf. *PH I*, 192-209. For a more detailed analysis of the assertive behavior of the Sceptic and hers/his uses of language, see BRITO 2014.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. appendix 1, passage 3.

So, without asserting that the truth has already been discovered – or that it is undiscoverable – (1), someone can keep on observing local habits for dealing with diseases, for instance (a). This procedure encourages the doctor to be aware of not thinking that there is only one possibility of cure or treatment for a disease, she/he is open minded for gathering information coming from different sources.

As they do not have a closed view to any new data, since they do not think that they have some stable and definitive knowledge of something – they instead think that the collected data is just the result of observations which can be compromised by particular circumstances (2) – they need to constantly examine their own approach and skills as doctors, but not only theirs, also that of other's (b).

As there are many ways of describing something, according to the ways someone interprets the collected data (3) and as the amount of data is never exhaustible, there must be a procedure for comparing data (c).

In short, our hypothesis can be schematized as follows:

- 1- Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Professors* (M I-VI), work which is especially concerned with the *tekhnai*, is not merely destructive, since if one characterizes the specific kind of approach which is refused by Sextus, by elimination, Sextus leaves untouched another way of approaching the crafts.
- 2- Mainly reading M I, II and V one can find a procedure, one way of approaching the crafts, whose name is *tērēsis* (and the vocabulary correlated to it, as *paratērēsis*)<sup>15</sup>.
- 3- In Sextus' works *tērēsis* has a twofold meaning: 3.a observation; 3.b observance.
- 4- On 3.b, observance is directly related to the exhortation to follow the normal life<sup>16</sup> and to follow the circumstantial uses of language (MI, MII).
- 5- On 3.a, observation is related to one part of the threefold procedure of the Empiricist doctors as narrated by Galen (*De sect.*; *De exp. med.*) and pseudo-Galen (*Int. med.*).
- 6- Hence, on *tērēsis* as observation, we can picture Sextus as an Empiricist doctor.

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<sup>15</sup> Cf. appendix 1, passage 5.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. appendix 1, passage 6.



7- But we can also find the other two parts of the threefold Empiricists' procedure: *historia* (as related to *autopsia*) and the "transition to the similar"<sup>17</sup>.

## Appendix 1: primary sources.

### 1- *Introd.* 14.683.5-14.684.5:

(a) [Who led the three sects?]. The Rationalist sect was led by Hippocrates of Cos, who was also its founder and the one who first established the Rationalist sect, then after him Diocles of Carystus, Praxagoras of Cos, Herophilus of Chalcedon, Erasistratus of Chios, Mnesitheus of Athens, and Asclepiades of Cian in Bithynia, which is also called Prusias. The Empiricist sect was led by Philinus of Cos, who breaking first with the Rationalist sect sought occasions to dispute with Herophilus, whose student he had been. Wishing to lead their own sect that would nonetheless be older than the Rationalist sect, they claimed that it had been founded by Acron of Agrigentum. After Philinus there was Serapion of Alexandria, then the two Apolloniuses, father and son, of Antioch. After them was Menodotus and Sextus, who brought it to perfection. Methodism was founded by Themison of Syrian Laodicea, who had acquired from Asclepiades the Rationalist what he needed to devise the Methodist sect. It was then perfected by Thessallus of Tralles. After them were Mnaseas, Dionysius, Proclus and Antipatrus. Forming their own faction within it were Olympiacus of Milesia, Menemachus of Aphrodisias and Soranus of Ephesus. Moreover, some, like Leonidas of Alexandria, combined the sects, while others were eclectics, such as Archigenes of Syrian Apamea. (*apud*. WALBRIDGE 2014, p. 208).

(b) [Τίνες προέστησαν τῶν τριῶν αἰρέσεων.] Προέστησαν δὲ τῆς μὲν λογικῆς αἰρέσεως Ἴπποκράτης Κῶος, ὃς καὶ αἰρεσιάρχης ἐγένετο καὶ πρῶτος συνέστησε τὴν λογικὴν αἵρεσιν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον Διοκλῆς ὁ Καρύστιος, Πραξαγόρας Κῶος, Ἡρόφιλος Χαλκηδόνιος, Ἐρασίστρατος Χίος, Μνησίθεος Ἀθηναῖος, Ἀσκληπιάδης Βιθυνὸς, Κιανὸς, ὃς καὶ Προυσίας ἐκαλεῖτο. τῆς δὲ ἐμπειρικῆς προέστησε Φιλῖνος Κῶος, ὁ πρῶτος αὐτὴν ἀποτεμνόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς αἰρέσεως, τὰς ἀφορμὰς λαβὼν παρὰ Ἡροφίλου, οὗ καὶ ἀκουστῆς ἐγένετο. θέλοντες δὲ ἀπαρχαῖζειν ἑαυτῶν τὴν αἵρεσιν, ἵνα ἢ πρεσβυτέρα τῆς λογικῆς, Ἄκρωνα τὸν Ἀκραγαντίνον φασιν ἄρξασθαι αὐτῆς. μετὰ Φιλῖνον ἐγένετο Σεραπίων Ἀλεξανδρεὺς, εἶτα Ἀπολλώνιοι δύο, πατὴρ τε καὶ υἱὸς, Ἀντιοχεῖς. μεθ' οὓς Μηνόδοτος καὶ Σέξτος, οἱ καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐκράτουν αὐτὴν. μεθοδικῆς δὲ ἤρξε μὲν Θεμίσιον ὁ Λαοδικεὺς τῆς Συρίας, παρ' Ἀσκληπιάδου τοῦ λογικοῦ ἐφοδιασθεὶς εἰς τὴν εὕρεσιν τῆς μεθοδικῆς αἰρέσεως. ἐτελείωσε δὲ αὐτὴν Θεσσαλὸς ὁ Τραλλιανός. οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοὺτους Μναςέας, Διονύσιος, Πρόκλος, Ἀντίπατρος· διεστασίασαν δὲ περὶ τινῶν ἐν αὐτῇ Ὀλυμπιακὸς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Μενέμαχος ὁ Ἀφροδισεὺς καὶ Σωρανὸς ὁ Ἐφέσιος. ἐγένοντο δὲ τινες καὶ ἐπισυνθετικοὶ, ὡς Λεωνίδης ὁ Ἀλεξανδρεὺς. καὶ ἐκλεκτοὶ, ὡς Ἀρχιγένης ὁ Ἀπαμεὺς τῆς Συρίας.

(c) A seita Racionalista foi liderada por Hipócrates de Cos, que foi também seu fundador e aquele que primeiro estabeleceu a seita Racionalista, então, após ele: Diocles de Caristo, Praxágoras de Cos, Herófilo da Calcedônia, Erasítrato de Quios, Mnesitheo de Atenas e Asclepiades de Cian, na Bitínia, que também é chamada de Prusias. A seita Empirista foi liderada por Filino de Cos, quem primeiramente rompeu com a seita Racionalista, buscando ocasiões para disputar com Herófilo, de quem foi aprendiz. Desejando liderar sua própria seita que, não obstante, seria mais antiga do que a seita Racionalista, pois afirmaram que ela fora fundada por Ácron de Agrigento. Após Filino houve Serápion de Alexandria, então os dois Apolônios, pai e filho, da Antioquia. Após estes houve Menodoto e Sexto [Empírico], que levou [a seita] à perfeição. O Metodismo foi fundado por Themison da Laodicéia síria, que adquiriu com Asclepiades, o Racionalista, o que precisava para inventar a seita Metodista. Foi então aperfeiçoada por Téssalo de

<sup>17</sup> I would like to emphasize that part of this research is built upon translations of some primary sources which in despite of their importance had not been published until 2013, such as: Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Rhetoricians* = MII (Sextus Empiricus. *Contra os retóricos*. Brito, R.P.; Huguenin, R. (trans). São Paulo: EdUNESP, 2013); Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Grammarians* = MI (Sextus Empiricus. *Contra os gramáticos*. Brito, R.P.; Huguenin, R. (trans). São Paulo: EdUNESP, 2015). There are also two other unprecedented and very relevant translations in progress: 1- Galen's *On the Medical Sects for Beginners*; 2- Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Astrologers* = MV. The research as whole is unparalleled in its field, however some first steps were given by M. Frede, M. Burnyeat, J. Barnes, E. Spinelli, D. Blank and R. Bett, to whom I shall recognize my debt.

Trales. Após estes houve Mnaseas, Dionísio, Proclo e Antípatro. Formando sua própria facção [dentro dos Metódicos] houve Olímpicos de Milésia, Menemacos de Afrodísias e Sorano de Éfeso. Ademais, alguns, como Leônidas de Alexandria, juntaram as seitas, enquanto outros eram ecléticos, como Arquiguenes da Apaméia síria.

**2- De Sectis 1.64.1-1.65.5:**

(a) The aim of the art of medicine is health, but its end is the possession of health. Doctors have to know by which means to bring about health, when it is absent, and by which means to preserve it, when it is present. Those things which bring about health when it is not there are called medicines and remedies; those things which preserve it when it is there, healthy regimens. Thus it is also that an ancient account says that medicine is the science of what is healthy and of what is unhealthy, calling healthy those things which preserve an existing health or restore a ruined health, unhealthy the opposite of these. For the doctor needs the knowledge of both to choose the one and to avoid the other. But whence one may come by the knowledge of these no longer is universally agreed upon. Some say that experience alone suffices for the art, whereas others think that reason, too, has an important contribution to make. (WALZER & FREDE 1985, p. 3).

(b) Τῆς ἰατρικῆς τέχνης σκοπὸς μὲν ἡ ὑγίεια, τέλος δ' ἡ κτήσις αὐτῆς. ἐξ ὧν δ' ἂν τις ἢ μὴ παροῦσαν ὑγίειαν ἐργάζοιτ' ἢ παροῦσαν διαφυλάττοι, γινώσκεσθαι μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς ἰατροῖς· καλεῖται δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐργαζόμενα τὴν μὴ οὔσαν ὑγίειαν ἰάματά τε καὶ βοηθήματα, τὰ δὲ φυλάττοντα τὴν οὔσαν [ὑγίειαν] ὑγιεινὰ διαιτήματα. ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην ὑγιειῶν καὶ νοσερῶν ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος φησὶν, ὑγιεινὰ μὲν καλῶν τὰ τε φυλάττοντα τὴν οὔσαν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὰ τὴν διεφθαρμένην ἀνασώζοντα, νοσερὰ δὲ τάναντία τούτων· δεῖται γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ ἰατρὸς τῆς γνώσεως ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐλέσθαι, τὰ δὲ φυγεῖν. ὅθεν δ' <ἂν> τὴν τούτων ἐπιστήμην ἐκπορίσαιοτο, οὐκέθ' [ὁμοίως] ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ πᾶσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν τὴν ἐμπειρίαν μόνην φασὶν ἀρκεῖν τῇ τέχνῃ, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ὁ λόγος οὐ σμικρὰ δοκεῖ συντελεῖν.

(c) O escopo da arte médica é a saúde, e seu fim a sua posse. É necessário ser sabido pelos médicos como fazer a saúde advir, quando ausente, ou mantê-la, quando presente. Chama-se de medicamentos e de remédios o que suscita a saúde quando está ausente, e de dietas saudáveis o que mantém [a saúde] quando presente. Eis porque o antigo relato diz que a medicina é a ciência das coisas saudáveis e das nocivas, sendo chamadas saudáveis as que mantêm a saúde quando presente e as que a restauram quando arruinada, e [sendo chamadas de] nocivas as diametralmente opostas a essas. Pois o médico precisa de ambos os conhecimentos para capturar uma e escapar da outra. Mas não há acordo entre todos sobre onde se encontraria o conhecimento de tais coisas, mas uns dizem que somente a experiência é suficiente para a arte, outros acham que a razão não pouco contribui.

**3- De Sectis 1.66.1-1.69.5:**

(a) The empiricists claim that the art comes about in the following way. One has observed many affections in people. Of these, some occur spontaneously, both in the sick and the healthy, e.g., nosebleeding, or sweat, or diarrhea, or something else of the kind which brings harm or advantage, though one cannot see what it is that produced the effect. In the case of other affections, the cause is manifest, but they, too, occur not due to some choice of ours, but somehow by chance. Thus it just so happened that somebody fell was hit or wounded in some other manner and that, hence, there was a flow of blood, or that somebody who was ill gratified his appetites and drank cold water or wine or something else of the kind, each of which had a harmful or beneficial effect. The first kind of beneficial or harmful event they called natural, the second, chance. But, in both cases, they called the first observation of such an event an incidence, choosing this name because one happens upon these things not on purpose. The incidental kind of experience, then, is roughly like this. The extemporaneous kind, on the other hand, is characterized by the fact that we deliberately come to try something, either led by dreams or forming a view as to what is to be done in some other fashion. But there is yet a third kind of experience, namely, the imitative one. An experience is imitative if something which has proved to be beneficial or harmful, either naturally or by chance or by extemporization, is tried out again for the same disease. It is this kind of experience which has contributed most to their art. For when they have imitated, not just twice or three times, but very many times, what has turned out to be beneficial on earlier occasions, and when they then find out that, for the most part, it has the same effect in the case of the same diseases, then they call such a memory a theorem and think that it already is trustworthy and forms part of the art. But when many such theorems had been accumulated by them, the whole accumulation amounted to the art of medicine, and the person who had accumulated the theorems, to a doctor. Such an accumulation came to be called by

them one's own perception. For what it consists in is a certain kind of memory of what one often has perceived to happen in the same way. But they also called the very same thing experience. History, on the other hand, they called the report of one's own perception. For the very same thing counts as one's own perception for the person who has made the observations, but as history for the person who is learning what has been observed. Now, it also sometimes happened that one encountered diseases which had not been seen before or diseases which were known, but which one encountered in areas where there was no ready supply of medicines which had been observed by experience. Hence they turned the transition to the similar into some sort of device to find remedies. By means of this device, they often transfer the same remedy from one affection to another and from one place affected to another, and they proceed from a previously known remedy to one quite similar. Thus they might make the transition from one disease to another by going from erysipelas to herpes, from one place affected to another, as from the arm to the thigh, from one remedy to another, as in the case of diarrhea, from apple to medlar. This kind of transition, as a whole, amounts to a method of invention but not yet to invention itself, before the test has been made. But, once one has put what one expected to the test, it already is trustworthy, if it has been confirmed by this, no less so than if it had been observed many times to happen in the same way. This experience which one has a result of the transition to the similar they call practiced, because one has to be practiced in the art if one wants to find something out in this way. But all the other experiences which were made before one had this kind of experience and which were needed to bring about the art can also be made by anyone. Such, then, is the method which proceeds by means of experience to attain the end of the art. (WALZER & FREDE 1985, pp. 4-5).

(b) Συστήσασθαι δὲ τὴν τέχνην οἱ μὲν ἐμπειρικοὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον φασίν. ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑώραν πάθη τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου γιγνόμενα νοσοῦσι τε καὶ ὑγιαίνουσιν, οἷον αἵματος ῥύσιν ἐκ ρινῶν ἢ ἰδρωτῶν ἢ διαρροίας ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο βλάβην ἢ ὠφέλειαν φέρον, οὐ μὴν τὸ γε ποιῆσαν αἴτιον αἰσθητὸν ἔχον, ἕτερα δ' ὧν τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ἐφαίνεται, οὐ μὴν ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἡμετέρας ἀλλὰ κατὰ τινα συντυχίαν, οἷον συνέβη πεσόντος τινὸς ἢ πληγέντος ἢ ἄλλως πως τραθέντος αἷμα ῥύσιν καὶ πιεῖν ἐν νόσῳ χαρισάμενον τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ ἢ οἶνον ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, ὧν ἕκαστον εἰς ὠφέλειαν ἢ βλάβην ἐτελεύτα, τὸ μὲν [οὔν] πρότερον εἶδος τῶν ὠφελούντων ἢ βλαπτόντων ἐκάλουν φυσικόν, τὸ δὲ δευτέρον τυχικόν· ἑκατέρου δ' αὐτῶν τὴν πρώτην θεῖαν περίπτωσιν ὠνόμαζον ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπίπτειν ἀβουλήτως τοῖς πράγμασι τοῦνομα θέμενοι. τὸ μὲν οὖν περιπτωτικὸν εἶδος τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖονδε τί ἐστι, τὸ δ' αὐτοσχέδιον, ὅταν ἐκόντες ἐπὶ τὸ πειράζειν ἀφίκονται ἢ ὑπ' ὄνειράτων προτραπέντες ἢ ἄλλως πως δοξάζοντες. ἀλλὰ καὶ τρίτον τῆς ἐμπειρίας εἶδος ἐστὶ τὸ μιμητικόν, ὅταν τῶν ὠφελυσάντων ἢ βλαψάντων ὀτιοῦν ἢ φύσει ἢ τύχῃ ἢ αὐτοσχεδίως ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν παθῶν αὐθις εἰς πείραν ἄγῃται, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ μάλιστα τὴν τέχνην αὐτῶν συστησάμενον· οὐ γὰρ δις μόνον ἢ τρίς ἀλλὰ καὶ πλειστάκις μιμησάμενοι τὸ πρόσθεν ὠφελήσαν, εἴτ' ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν παθῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ποιοῦν εὐρίσκοντες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὴν τοιαύτην μνήμην θεώρημα καλέσαντες ἤδη πιστὸν ἡγοῦνται καὶ μέρος τῆς τέχνης. ὡς δὲ πολλὰ θεωρήματα τοιαῦτ' ἠθροίζετ' αὐτοῖς, ἰατρικὴ μὲν ἦν τὸ σύμπαν ἄθροισμα καὶ ὁ ἄθροισας ἰατρός. ἐκλήθη δ' ὑπ' αὐτῶν αὐτοψία τὸ τοιοῦτον ἄθροισμα, μνήμη τις οὕσα τῶν πολλάκις καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄφθεντων. ὠνόμαζον δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμπειρίαν, ἱστορίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν αὐτοῦ· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῷ μὲν τηρήσαντι αὐτοψία, τῷ δὲ μαθόντι τὸ τετηρημένον ἱστορία ἐστίν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νοσήμασι τισιν ἢ ἐνετύγχανον ἔστιν ὅτε πρόσθεν οὐχ ἑωραμένοις ἢ τισιν ἐγνωσμένοις μὲν ἀλλ' ἐν χωρίοις, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἦν ἰαμάτων εὐπορία τῶν διὰ τῆς πείρας τετηρημένων, ὄργανόν τι βοηθημάτων εὐρετικὸν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν τοῦ ὁμοίου μετάβασιν, ᾧ χρώμενοι πολλάκις καὶ ἀπὸ πάθους ἐπὶ πάθος [ὁμοίον] τὸ αὐτὸ βοήθημα μεταφέρουσι καὶ ἀπὸ τόπου ἐπὶ τόπον καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρόσθεν ἐγνωσμένου βοηθήματος ἐπὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον ἔρχονται, ἀπὸ μὲν πάθους ἐπὶ πάθος, ὡς εἰ ἂν ἐρυσσιπέλατος ἐφ' ἔρηπτα μεταβαίνοιν, ἀπὸ δὲ τόπου ἐπὶ τόπον, ὡς ἀπὸ βραχίονος ἐπὶ μηρόν, ἀπὸ δὲ βοηθήματος ἐπὶ βοήθημα, ὡς ἐν διαρροίαις ἀπὸ μήλου ἐπὶ μέσπilon. ἅπανα δ' ἢ τοιαύτη μετάβασις ὁδὸς μὲν ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὴν εὐρεσιν, εὐρεσις δ' οὐδέπω πρὸ τῆς πείρας, ἀλλ' ἠνίκ' ἂν τὸ ἐλπισθὲν εἰς πείραν ἀχθῆ, πιστὸν ἤδη τὸ μαρτυρηθὲν ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ εἰ πλειστάκις καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἐτετήρητο. τὴν δὲ πείραν ταύτην τὴν ἐπομένην τῇ τοῦ ὁμοίου μετάβασει τριβικὴν καλοῦσιν, ὅτι χρή τετρίφθαι κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὸν μέλλοντά τι οὕτως εὐρήσειν· αἱ δ' ἐμπροσθεν ἅπαναι πείραι αἱ πρὸ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, ὧν εἰς σύστασιν ἐδείθ' ἢ τέχνη, καὶ περὶ τὸν τυχόντα δύνανται γενέσθαι. τοιαύτη μὲν ἢ διὰ τῆς πείρας πρὸς τὸ τέλος τῆς τέχνης ὁδός.

(c) Os Empiristas dizem que a arte é organizada do seguinte modo. Uma vez observou-se que muitas das afecções humanas se dão espontaneamente, tanto nos doentes quanto nos saudáveis, como o sangramento nasal ou a sudorese, a diarreia ou outra coisa assim, que trouxe dano ou vantagem, de modo algum tendo uma causa produtiva perceptível. Quanto às outras [afecções], a causa é manifesta, não advindo por escolha nossa, mas por acaso, como quando ocorre que alguém caiu ou foi golpeado, ou ferido de algum outro modo, o sangue fluiu; e quando, na doença, bebeu água fria, vinho ou outra coisa assim, satisfazendo seu apetite, cada um destes terminando em benefício ou dano; [então] ao primeiro tipo de coisa benéfica ou danosa chamaram de natural, ao segundo de casual; mas, em ambos os casos, chama-se

de incidência a primeira visão [das coisas benéficas ou danosas], dando esse nome por algo incidir sobre as circunstâncias involuntariamente. Tal então é o tipo de experiência incidental. Mas há a impremeditada, quando deliberadamente se tenta algo, ou compelido por sonhos ou por quaisquer outras suposições. E há um terceiro tipo de experiência, a imitativa, quando algo benéfico ou danoso, tanto naturalmente quanto casualmente ou impremeditadamente, é experimentado recursivamente nas mesmas afecções. E é principalmente este [tipo] que constituiu sua arte; pois tendo imitado, não somente duas ou três, mas muitas vezes o que causou benefício anteriormente, em seguida descobriram que, na maioria dos casos, o produto era o mesmo nas mesmas afecções – e a tal rememoração chamaram de teorema, já considerada confiável e parte da arte. Assim, tendo-se coletado muitos desses teoremas por eles, a totalidade da coletânea é a medicina, e o coletor, o médico. Tal coletânea foi chamada por eles de autópsia, sendo um tipo de rememoração do que foi visto muitas vezes e do mesmo modo. Mas também chamaram essa mesma coisa de experiência, e a sua divulgação de história; pois para o observador [a rememoração] é autópsia, por outro lado, é história para quem aprende o que foi observado. Mas, uma vez que se deparavam com algumas doenças que não haviam sido vistas anteriormente ou com outras que eram conhecidas, em locais nos quais não havia provisão de medicamentos observados por meio de experimentos, criaram um instrumento para descobrir remédios: a transição para o semelhante, com ajuda da qual amiúde transferem o mesmo remédio de afecção à afecção, de lugar a lugar [afetado], e de um remédio previamente conhecido vão para um parecido. De afecção a afecção, como se passassem da erisipela à herpes, de lugar a lugar [afetado], como do braço à coxa, de remédio a remédio como, na diarreia, da maçã à nêspera. Toda essa transição é um caminho para a descoberta, mas a descoberta nunca antecede o experimento. Uma vez que se colocou em experimento aquilo que se esperava, já é confiável sendo confirmado por esse [experimento], não menos do que se tivesse sido observado amiúde e do mesmo modo. A este experimento que acompanha a transição para o semelhante chamam de prático, porque é preciso ser prático na arte caso se pretenda descobrir algo desse modo. Todos os experimentos que antecedem a experiência, dos quais a arte necessitava para a sua constituição, podem ser criados pelas pessoas comuns. Tal é o caminho através do experimento para [alcançar] o fim da arte.

#### 4- PHI,1-3:

(a) The natural result of any investigation is that the investigators either discover the object of search or deny that it is discoverable and confess it to be inapprehensible or persist in their search. So, too, with regard to the objects investigated by philosophy, this probably why some have claimed to have discovered the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, while other again go on inquiring. Those who belie they have discovered it are the “Dogmatists”, specially so called – Aristotle, for example, and Epicurus and the Stoics and certain others; Cleitomachus and Carneades and other Academics treat it as inapprehensible: the Sceptics keep on searching. (BURY1933).

(b) Τοῖς ζητοῦσί τι πρᾶγμα ἢ εὕρεσιν ἐπακολουθεῖν εἰκὸς ἢ ἄρνησιν εὐρέσεως καὶ ἀκαταληψίας ὁμολογίαν ἢ ἐπιμονὴν ζητήσεως. διόπερ ἴσως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ζητουμένων οἱ μὲν εὕρηκέναι τὸ ἀληθές ἔφασαν, οἱ δ' ἀπεφίηναντο μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι τοῦτο καταληφθῆναι, οἱ δὲ ἔτι ζητοῦσιν. καὶ εὕρηκέναι μὲν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἰδίως καλούμενοι δογματικοί, οἷον οἱ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ τοὺς Στωικοὺς καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, ὡς δὲ περὶ ἀκαταλήπτων ἀπεφίηναντο οἱ περὶ Κλειτόμαχον καὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀκαδημαῖκοί, ζητοῦσι δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί.

(c) Para os que investigam alguma coisa, o resultado provável é, ou a descoberta dessa coisa, ou a negação da descoberta, admitindo que é inapreensível, ou a persistência na investigação. Por isso, do mesmo modo, quanto à investigação filosófica, uns afirmaram que descobriram a verdade, outros proclamaram que esta não é capaz de ser apreendida, enquanto outros seguem investigando. Os que pensam que a descobriram são propriamente chamados de dogmáticos, tais como os discípulos de Aristóteles e os de Epicuro, os estoicos e alguns outros; já os discípulos de Clitômaco e de Carneades, por outro lado, assim como outros acadêmicos proclamaram-na inapreensível; enquanto os céticos continuam investigando.

#### 5- M V,103-104:

(a) And in general, since they declare that it is not the stars that inform them of the differences in men's lives but they themselves observe them together with the positions of the stars, I affirm that if the prediction is to be reliable, the same position of the stars ought not to be observed once only in connexion with the life of some one person, but a second time with a second life, and a third time with a third, so that from the equality of the resultant effects in all the cases we might learn that when the stars have assumed a certain configuration the result will certainly be of one particular kind; and just as in medicine

we have observed that a puncture of the heart is the cause of death, after having observed together with it not only the death of Dion but also of Theon and Socrates and many others, so also in astrology, if it is credible that this particular configuration of the stars is indicative of that particular kind of life, then it certainly has been observed not once only in one single case, but many times in many cases.” (BURY 1949).

(b) καθόλου δέ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἐνδείκνυσθαι λέγουσιν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀστέρας τὰς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων βίων διαφοράς, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ ταύτας συμπαρατετηρηκέναι ταῖς τῶν ἀστέρων σχέσεσι, φημί ὅτι εἰ μελλήσει βέβαιος πρόρρησις γίνεσθαι, δεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν τῶν ἀστέρων σχέσιν μὴ ἅπαξ συμπαρατετηρηκέναι τῷ ἐνὸς τινὸς βίῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ δευτέρον δευτέρου καὶ τρίτον τρίτου, ἵνα ἐκ τοῦ διομαλίζειν ἐπὶ πάντων τὰς τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἐκβάσεις μάθωμεν, ὅτι τῶν ἀστέρων τοιοῦτον ἀναδεξαμένων τὸν σχηματισμὸν τότε πάντως ἔσται τὸ ἀποβησόμενον· καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἐτηρήσαμεν ὅτι ἡ τῆς καρδίας περίψυξις ἔστι θάνατος, οὐ τὴν Δίωνος μόνον τελευτὴν αὐτῇ συμπαρατηρήσαντες ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεῶνος καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν μαθηματικῇ εἰ πιστὸν ἔστιν ὅτι ὅδε ὁ σχηματισμὸς τῶν ἀστέρων τοιοῦτου βίου μηνυτικὸς καθέστηκεν, πάντως οὐχ ἅπαξ ἐφ' ἐνὸς ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἂν ἐπὶ πολλῶν παρατηρήθῃ.

(c) Mas no geral, uma vez que dizem que as diferenças nas vidas dos homens não são demonstradas a eles pelos astros, mas as próprias posições dos astros são atentamente observadas por eles, digo que se a previsão a ser feita deve ser segura, a posição dos astros precisa ser observada não uma única vez com relação à vida de alguém, mas uma segunda [vez com relação à vida de uma] segunda, e uma terceira [vez] com uma terceira [pessoa], então, a partir da consistência de todos os efeitos resultantes, aprenderíamos que, tendo tais astros exibido tal configuração, o resultado certamente é tal; do mesmo modo que na medicina observamos que um ferimento no coração é mortal, tendo sido observada não somente a morte de Díon, mas também de Théon e Sócrates e muitos outros, e também nessa ciência [i.e. a astrologia] se é crido que tal configuração dos astros é indicativa de tal situação da vida, então isto certamente foi observado não somente uma vez, mas muitas e em muitos [casos].

#### 6- PH I, 23:

(a) Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive. And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. (BURY 1933).

(b) τοῖς φαινομένοις οὖν προσέχοντες κατὰ τὴν βιωτικὴν τήρησιν ἀδοξάστως βιοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ἀνενέργητοι παντάπασιν εἶναι. εἴοικε δὲ αὕτη ἡ βιωτικὴ τήρησις τετραμερὴς εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχειν ἐν ὑψηλῇ φύσει, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀνάγκῃ παθῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐν παραδόσει νόμων τε καὶ ἐθῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνῶν (...)

(c) Portanto, aderindo às aparências, vivemos de modo não opinativo, de acordo com a observância da vida comum, uma vez que não podemos ser totalmente inativos. Essa observância da vida comum parece ser quadripartida: uma <parte> sustenta-se na orientação da natureza, outra na necessidade das afecções, outra na sujeição às leis e também aos costumes, outra no ensino dos ofícios.

#### Appendix 2: the three medical sects and their main heads, according to pseudo-Galen, *Introd.*14.683.5-14.684.5:

BC:	RATIONALISTS	EMPIRICISTS	METHODISTS
460-370	Hippocrates of Cos	Acron of Agrigentum	
375-295	Diocles of Carystus		
c. 340	Praxagoras of Cos		

335-255	Herophilus of Chalcedon		
c. 300	Mnesitheus of Athens	Philinus of Cos	
304-c.250	Erasistratus of Chios		
c. 250		Serapion of Alexandria	
c.150		Apollonius of Antioch (father)	
c.130-40	Asclepiades of Bithynia	Apollonius of Antioch (son), so-called Empiricist	
c. 50			Themison of Laodicea
<b>AD:</b>			
c. 70			Thessalus of Tralles
“			Mnaseas of Tralles
“			Dionysius
“			Proclus
c. 110			Antipatrus
“			Olympiacus of Milesia
“			Menemachus of Aphrodisias
“			Soranus of de Ephesus
c. 150		Menodotus	
c. 160		Sextus, so-called Empiricist	
c. 200			Archigenes of Apamea (beginning of the Eclectics?)
“			Leonidas of Alexandria (Eclectic?)

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