THE SAME IN PLATO'´S SOPHIST

Abstract

This paper aims at determining the contribution of the kind same to the overall purpose of Plato's Sophist by contrasting semantic and syntactic interpretations. Preliminarily, it examines the reasons for the individuation of the kind being in 250a8-c5, pointing out that they depend on two ways of saying being, the collective and the distributive, which are identified by specific syntactic forms. The investigation of the same begins with a reconstruction of the controversial argument in 255a4-b7, which shows not only that it is valid, but also that the collective and distributive modes of saying are central to it. Next, it shows that passage 255b8-c8 bears no proof for the distinction between same and being, which is found only in 256a3-b5, due the introduction of two other modes of saying: according to oneself and in relation to another. A parallel of this result with the being/different distinction found in 255c13-d7 leads to the conclusion that the same differs from being as the kind that only says a being in relation to another. Because this formulation allows for a syntactic distinction between same and being in patterns that grant the equivalence of not-being and different, it is central to the purpose of the dialogue. Therewith, it is also proved that syntactic interpretations are more charitable to the text.