PRACTICAL FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY OF THE WILL: KANT, ALLISON AND THE IMPUTABILITY OF EVIL
The subject of the present article is the problem of the imputability of moral evil in Kant’s practical philosophy. I propose an assessment of Henry Allison`s approach of this theme in his referential book “Kant`s Theory of Freedom” (1990). The reason of my choice is that Allison, one of the most influential commentators in the contemporary debate on Kant`s philosophy, strongly contributed to a tendency in the last three decades to neglect a real difficulty that threatens not only the rationale of the imputability of moral evil, but also the coherence of Kant`s undisputed thesis of a merely imperative morality for human volition. My analysis concentrates on section II (“Autonomy as a Property of the Will”) of chapter 5 (“Rational Agency and Autonomy”) of Allison`s work, which constructs the meaning of free choice against morality from a conceptual debate on Kant`s notions of “practical freedom” and “autonomy of the will”.