



Alfred Schutz's Sociological Phenomenology: contributions to qualitative research in educational practice

Fenomenologia Sociológica de Alfred Schutz: contribuições para a investigação qualitativa em prática educativa

Fenomenología sociológica de Alfred Schutz: contribuciones a la investigación cualitativa en la práctica educativa

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Abstract: This article aims to present the results of research on contributions from Alfred Schutz's Sociological Phenomenology to qualitative research in educational practice. Initially it has presented Husserlian foundations contained in Shutzian phenomenology. Then, it has related about the methodological application of sociological phenomenology, in research on educational practice and it has showed the following contributions: a) apprehension of educational practice as an object of consciousness, which means to understand that in its subjective dimension; b) reflection on the researcher's and investigated one's role in research relation, taking the empirical field as a problematization space; c) refinement of data production and analysis tools; d) potentialization of research as a process.

Keywords: Sociological Phenomenology. Qualitative Research. Educational Practice.

Resumo: Esse artigo tem como objetivo apresentar resultado de pesquisa sobre contribuições da Fenomenologia Sociológica de Alfred Schutz, para a investigação qualitativa em prática educativa. Inicialmente apresenta fundamentos husserlianos presentes na fenomenologia shutziana. Em seguida, a aplicação metodológica da fenomenologia sociológica, em pesquisas sobre prática educativa e as seguintes contribuições: a) apreensão da prática educativa como objeto da consciência, o que significa apreendê-la na sua dimensão subjetiva; b) reflexão sobre o papel do pesquisador e do pesquisado na relação de pesquisa, tomando o campo empírico como campo de problematização; c) refinamento de instrumentos de produção e análise de dados; d) potencialização da pesquisa como processo.

Palavras-chave: Fenomenologia Sociológica. Investigação Qualitativa. Prática Educativa.

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Resumen: Este artículo tiene como propósito presentar los resultados de la investigación sobre las contribuciones de la Sociología Fenomenológica de Alfred Schütz para la investigación cualitativa en la práctica educativa. Inicialmente se presentan los fundamentos husserlianos presentes en la fenomenología schütziana. A continuación, se presenta la aplicación metodológica de la sociología fenomenológica en investigaciones sobre la práctica educativa y las siguientes aportaciones: a) aprehensión de la práctica educativa como objeto de conciencia, lo que significa aprehenderla en su dimensión subjetiva; b) reflexión sobre el papel del investigador y el investigado en la relación de investigación, tomando el campo empírico como un campo de problematización; c) perfeccionamiento de los instrumentos de producción y análisis de datos; d) potenciación de la investigación como proceso.

Palabras clave: Sociología Fenomenológica. Investigación Cualitativa. Práctica educativa.

INTRODUCTION

As researchers, we use to ask ourselves: What is a phenomenon? How does it present itself? How to apprehend it? Such questions lead us to the method. The method involves conceptions about reality (ontology), human nature (anthropology) and nature of knowledge, its production and communication (epistemology). Well, research in master's and doctoral courses, as well as master's and doctoral orientation, were and are accompanied by concern to make the educational phenomenon scientifically analytical, which points, fundamentally, to the problem of method. That concern, in the area of education, becomes even more urgent because it uses theoretical and methodological contributions from different epistemological matrices and, with that, there is a risk of conceptual transposition from one field to the other, without due mediations, without paying attention to limits and possibilities of its application to research in education.

About research in educational practice, we start from the idea that it is production of meanings, so we try to investigate “what, in reality, makes sense and how it makes sense for the subjects investigated” (AMADO, 2017, p.41, highlighted by the author). This starting point places the research developed within the scope of phenomenological-interpretative research, whose central points are the intentions and meanings, which guide the action of subjects, in relationship with the other and with contexts in which they happen. (AMADO, 2017).

Thus, this article highlights fundamentals of Sociological Phenomenology and hypotheses for its methodological application in research on educational practice.

THEORETICAL ASPECTS ON SOCIOLOGICAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND METHODOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES OF ITS APPLICATION IN RESEARCH ON EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE



Alfred Schutz's sociological phenomenology is inserted in social sciences as a sociology of everyday life, because influenced by Weberian sociology, it seeks the subjective meaning of social conduct; however, it is in concepts of conscience and intentionality, in Husserl, that Schutz will rely on to develop theory and method of appropriation of meanings of social action, which implies thinking about how phenomena present themselves to consciousness. Schutz (2012) takes as a principle that it is only possible to know the significant experience of the subjects, through knowledge of intentionality, a movement that only conscience is responsible for doing. It is important to say that Schutz, based on Husserl's philosophical principles, “gives sociological consistency to Husserl's philosophical principles and creates theory and method for approaching social reality.”(MINAYO, 2010, p.144).

According to Husserl, what we call "world" or "reality" is not a set or a system of things and people, animals and plants. The world or reality is a set of meanings or senses that are produced by reason. Reason is a “giver of meaning” and it “constitutes reality” as systems of meanings that depend on the structure of consciousness itself. Meanings are not personal, psychological, social, but universal and necessary. They are the essences, that is, the impersonal, timeless, universal and necessary sense of all reality, which exists only for consciousness and by consciousness. Reason is subjective reason that creates the world as objective rationality, that is, the world has objective meaning because reason gives it meaning. So, for example, reason does not study the psychological contents of my personal life, but asks: What is psychic life? What is memory, imagination, sensation, perception? The question "What is" does not refer to a description of mental and physical processes that make us remember, imagine, feel or perceive. That question refers to the description of the meaning of memory, of sensation, of perception, that is, it refers to their essences, regardless of our personal psychological experiences. Phenomenology does not ask, for example, if a certain idea or a certain opinion is caused by life in society, but asks: What is social? What is society? The answers to those questions form the meanings or essences and they are the content that reason itself offers itself to make sense of reality. Phenomenology thus departs from the Hegelian solution, as it does not admit that forms and contents of reason change over time and with time. They enrich and expand in time, but they do not change because of time.

As we have said, phenomenon is simply what is offered to the intellectual eye, to pure observation, and phenomenology presents itself as a purely descriptive study of experiential facts of thought and knowledge arising from that observation. The phenomenologist does not seek, then, to know, as the logician does, under what conditions a judgment is true; or like a sage, who asks if it is true that ...; or as the psychologist who wants to know what is actually going on in consciousness. Phenomenologist only asks what is the meaning of what we have in spirit when we judge, state, live.



Phenomenology is never oriented towards facts, whether external, internal, but, rather, to the reality of consciousness, to objects as intended by and in consciousness, that is, to ideal essences. For the phenomenologist, ideal essences are not simple representations (which would be placing oneself on the psychological plane), nor hypostasized ideal realities (making them substances, which would be placing oneself on the metaphysical plane). The ideal essences are phenomena for the phenomenologist, that is, what is immediately manifested in consciousness, reached by an intuition before any reflection or judgment. Making the world appear as a phenomenon means understanding that the being of world is not its existence, that is, its factual reality, but its meaning and that the meaning of world lies in fact that it is a *Cogitatum* targeted by *Cogito*. What the phenomenological reduction will make evident is not the *Cogito* alone, but the *Ego-Cogito-Cogitatum*, that is, the consciousness of this world, the constitutive awareness of sense of world. In that perspective, the world is not an existence but a simple phenomenon, meaning (GILES, 1975, p. 132).

Based on Husserl's Phenomenology, one cannot simply confuse sense with meaning of a term or a proposition. If we want, sense can also be analyzed under the aspect meaning, but whenever it includes not only the relationship, but also the coordination of sign with object. A phenomenology of meaning was elaborated, according to which it occurs under several aspects: as a semantic sense, as a structural or eidetic sense, as a fundamental or logical sense and as a sense of motivation (MORA, 1982). In such a way that, when talking about meaning, it will be necessary to know which of the mentioned concepts that refers to, and what the relationship is established between one and the other and between each and all the others. Also the meaninglessness or the counter-sense are manifested differently in each of the senses. The characteristic of this investigation is, therefore, the determination of different meanings in which the sense can be given, including the meaning itself as one of its forms. Other investigations, on the other hand, refer instead to the moment of unification of meaning, either under a metaphysical aspect, or under a psychological or scientific aspect. Some consider, for example, the sense as a peculiar direction that, in turn, constitutes one of the essential dimensions of the world of spirit in its two forms: subjective and objective.

The phenomenological investigation on the meaning allowed, on the other hand, not only through parentheses the identification, but, also, to consider as relatively separate the different meanings of the term sense. Husserl's starting point is a critique of empiricist psychology, like the humean one. In Hume's case, the reduction of causality to a psychological mechanism is to deny causality as truth. It is stealing all true meaning from causality, it is disqualifying it from its origins. Now, Husserl does not want a science that disqualifies its object: phenomenology intends to replace a philosophy of explanation by the origin with an elucidation of meaning. In that direction, phenomenology proposes an eidetic reduction: the essence of bravery, for example, cannot be



reduced to the memory I have of hero, to this anecdotal psychological content, just as the essence of the triangle cannot be reduced to the approximate figure drawn in a blackboard, but through drawing I aim at the triangle, through the story of the hero which I have a value, bravery. To psychological reduction that disqualifies essences by their origin, Husserl opposes, then, the eidetic reduction that apprehends the essence in its truth.

Husserl's philosophy is, in fact, also opposed to absolute realism. Absolute realism, in other words, the attitude that consists of taking into account only objects and ignoring the thinking subject, is, for Husserl, a naive, pre-philosophical attitude. It is precisely the banal and dangerous illusion, current prejudice that he denounces, as already pointed out, under the name of "natural attitude". Natural consciousness, one that is not philosophically educated, knows only objects. We have objects in front of us and we tend to forget that objects only exist for the thinking subject, a subject initially concealed, precisely because he himself is not an object, but the one in front of which the objects exist. The primary function of all philosophy is to correct that forgetfulness, to reveal to itself that constituent consciousness for which and by which objects exist. It is through methodical and universal doubt that Descartes strives to move us away from the thought object - always doubtful - to reveal us the thinking subject, the very act of doubting, whose existence is undoubted. That moment of *cogito* is also present in Husserlian itinerary. But, Husserl replaces the Cartesian doubt with a more subtle, more nuanced attitude, which is the simple "placement in parentheses" of the world, the *epoche* in Greek. The philosopher is limited to suspending the "general thesis of existence of the world", to putting it out of the loop, although he does not radically deny the existence of outside world.

Consequently, the placing in parentheses of all substantial existence is exactly a phenomenological reduction, because my experience there is properly "reduced" to what is given, what appears, what is manifested authentically. Now, what is this that is truly given? Nothing less than the world is. Because I don't just apprehend myself as "I think", I apprehend myself as thinking something. Indeed, all consciousness, according to Husserlian phenomenology, is awareness of something. All consciousness aims at an object and it is this propensity that it calls "intentionality". Husserl notes all consciousness is aimed at an object, it being understood which that object is nothing but an object for consciousness, that an object relative to intentional propensity of consciousness. Finally, Husserl poses a major problem that Descartes and Kant had ignored in their theories of knowledge. It's the other's problem. Just as all consciousness is consciousness of something, so our consciousness recognizes the existence of another consciousness, in an original experience of coexistence. The other is not only the one I see, but the one who sees me and is also a transcendental source of a world that is given to him.



Husserl's phenomenology presents “the ideal conditions for the possibility of knowledge in general, or of deductive and theoretical knowledge in general” (HUSSERL, 2015, p.IX). Such objective unfolds in the interest in investigating the conditions and possibilities of true knowledge and, for that, it proposes a phenomenology of essence, in opposition to a positive science, above all, the modern psychology that, according to him, starts from generalizations obtained by induction and, with that, the impossibility of establishing universal and necessary truths, therefore, logical truths. Husserl is concerned with presenting the rules for how thought works and, for him, consciousness is structured according to the logical form. (REALE, 1991).

In formulating a theory of phenomenological knowledge, Husserl will turn, above all, to the analysis of essences. For him, what is shown in the phenomenon is not only sensory, but, rather, it is what it becomes when it presents itself to consciousness, when we conceptualize it; ultimately, it is the senses given to things, by consciousness, which gives meaning to reality. The subject, in Husserl, is consciousness; consciousness that does not depend on the sensitive experience to formulate knowledge, but it is only in consciousness that knowledge is produced, because only it is able to capture the essence of phenomenon, as a product of reflection. We understand that consciousness exists for an object, its functionality is intentionally directed towards the object. In Husserl, the “Acts” of object perception


[...] must be the experiences of signifying, and the significant in each singular act must reside precisely [in act experiences] and not in the object [and] must reside in what makes them an “intentional”, “directed” experience for the objects. (HUSSERL, 2015, pp.293-294).

Still in the words of Husserl,

It will become clear that the concept of act, in sense of intentional experience, delimits an important genre in the sphere of experiences (captured in its phenomenological purity) and that, thus, the insertion of experiences of meaning in this genre provides us, indeed, a valuable characterization of them (HUSSERL, 2015, p.294).

We understand that the content of experience is not in objects, but in consciousness and, perhaps, at this point, we can find a force to relate principles of Husserlian phenomenology and Schutz's sociological phenomenology, as the latter seeks to access “objects of the world, intended by the conscience” and, with that, to know the meaning of experience that, in a phenomenal language, would be to know the contents of experiences or content of conscience, defined as

[...] perceptions, fantasy representations and image representations, conceptual thought acts, assumptions and doubts, joys and pains, hopes and fears, desires and volitions, and the like, as they take place in our conscience. And, with those



experiences in their totality and concrete fullness, the abstract parts and moments that compose them are also lived, abstract parts and moments are contents of real consciences. Of course, it matters little whether the parts in question are, in themselves, articulated in some way, whether they are delimited by acts that are referred to, and, especially, whether they are themselves objects of “internal” perceptions, which capture them in their existence of consciousness, and whether, in general, they can be or not. Let it now also be indicated that this concept of experience can be taken in a purely phenomenological way, that is, in such a way that any reference to the empirical-real existence is excluded [...] (HUSSERL, 2015, p. 296, emphasis added).

We retain this passage of attention so as not to make the mistake of taking both the appearance of the object to perception as the apparent object as such as an experience. In fact, the appearance of thing is phenomenal, we experience it as a phenomenon, therefore, the content of consciousness is phenomenal

If we appear to ourselves as members of the phenomenal world, then physical and psychic things (bodies and people) appear in a physical and psychic reference to our phenomenal self. That reference from phenomenal object (which we like to refer to as content of consciousness) to phenomenal subject (the self as an empirical person, as a thing) must understandably be separated from the reference to the content of consciousness, in our sense of experience, to consciousness in sense of unity of contents of consciousness (phenomenological consistency of empirical self) (HUSSERL, 2015, pp.298-299)

All that explanation about the concept of experience, as an intentional experience, is part of Husserl's objective of making clear the difference between the concept of consciousness in psychology and phenomenology. According to Husserl (2015), in psychology, the term consciousness is used to separate psychic and physical phenomena. In case of phenomenology, what matters is to define, according to its essence, the concept of psychic act, as it is an expression of domain of psychology.

In order to define what would be a psychic act, Husserl (2015) takes as a starting point three concepts of consciousness. The first starts from the idea that there is a purely phenomenological experience, without any reference to empirical existence, which he calls consciousness as phenomenological consistency of the self.

[...] here, it is about the relation of a singular experience to the complex of experiences. In the same way, and instead, the reference of self-person who appears to the thing that appears externally must be distinct, naturally, from the relationship between the thing-like appearance, as an experience, and the thing that appears (HUSSERL, 2015, p.299)



Husserl distinguishes between real content, the thing that appears, and intentional content, which is essence, example:

If someone says: “I experienced the wars of 1866 and 1870”, what in this sense is called “experienced” is a complex of external events, and experiencing here consists of perceptions, judgments and other acts, in which these events become an objective appearance and, often, objects of a certain act of position referring to the empirical self. The consciousness that experiences them, in phenomenological sense for us determinant, does not naturally have those events in them, as well as the things that are part of them, as their “psychic experiences”, as their real integrating elements or content (HUSSERL, 2015, p .300, emphasis added)


We understand, based on the definition of intentional experience directed towards objects, that the simple appearance of the thing to the conscience, does not yet constitute itself as a phenomenon and, therefore, we observe that the phenomena cannot be taken as data in themselves. We can then think that Schutz (2012), when questioning whether the meanings, the motivations of social actions would not have a relationship with a certain structure of consciousness, found in the idea of intentional living in Husserl, clues to create theory and method of appropriation of meanings of social action.

A second definition of consciousness presented by Husserl is that of an "internal" consciousness as an internal perception. In that case, the internal perception would be a perception of intentional experience, which differs from an adequate perception regarding the object, which is: “internal perception (while perception of experiences themselves) and adequate perception (evident)” (HUSSERL, 2015, p. 304). The third concept starts from the *cogito ergo sum* to eliminate any attempt to understand the *empirical self* as *the self*, since that refers to adequate perception. *The self* that Husserl refers to

[...] now something larger is added than everything that retention, essentially connected with perception, reveals as having been even now present; and, the same happens with the iterative recollection, while belonging to a previous actuality of experiences, when all this is reduced to its past phenomenological content, when, consequently, through reflection “in” retention and remembrance, we return to reproductively phenomenological. (HUSSERL, 2015, pp.305-306, emphasis added).

From that passage, retention and remembrance are presented as ways to access the intentional experience, reflective data, then. There is a data, therefore, that is in “flow of life”, which we can call experience of data, as it presents itself to sensory perception. In words of Husserl

[...] we can consider it as coexistent with what is adequately perceived at every moment, or as having been coexistent with the reflective data of retention and iterative recall, and certainly as being with it continuously and unitarily connected. [...].And the units of coexistence move constantly from time to time, they constitute



a unit of change, that of the flow of consciousness [...]. Each time point of that time is presented by means of a continuous illumination of “sensations of time”, so to speak; each current phase of the flow of consciousness, as it presents a whole time horizon of flow [...] (HUSSERL, 2015, pp.305-306, emphasis added).

On the Husserlian idea that intentional living is in the flow of consciousness, Schutz (2012) when trying to access the significant experience present in this flow, starts from four principles: 1° To capture the structure of the experience, it is necessary to reflect on it, as we only apprehend the movement that has already completed its course; 2° The experience in the flow of consciousness is a continuous becoming, as it is embedded the idea that conscience has freedom in face of the reduction of man to predictable and manipulable laws; 3° To live in flow of consciousness is to live in a continuum, in a multiplicity of events; 4° Remembrance and retention are essential to preserve some of the past experience (SCHUTZ, 2012).

With that, we take as the first methodological principle in Husserl the idea that it is the experiences of the conscious human being that acts and lives in a world, that he perceives and interprets, that makes sense to him, that is, the human being is aware of things as he understands that they exist outside of him and will continue to exist. Furthermore, you can access them through memory, in a typified way, when synthesizing different perspectives of reality (SCHUTZ, 2012). That principle reveals there is a physical plane and a plane of consciousness, in transition from one to the other there is an important element that mediates between these two planes, which is representation. In representation process, consciousness apprehends the world subjectively and it is exactly the subjectivity of experience that interests us, practicing here phenomenological psychology, which points, among other aspects, to the difference between physical experience and phenomenological experience.

We have then that the forms of consciousness are linked to the content of subjective experience, which deals with the perceived thing and there we have the phenomenological reduction method and the description of what is perceived, therefore, eidetic reduction. When we try to apprehend methodologically the educational practice, as content of educators' conscience, in different formative spaces, we observe that, even sharing the same context, consciences apprehend differently; there are always additions of content in narratives that we may be able to think of, they are part of representation in Husserlian molds, so it is the individual experience, with an emphasis on subjectivity or, in Schutzian terms, the individual experience as a derivative experience of the other selves (family , work, religion) and society. Perhaps one can think that Schutz, when using Husserlian method of access to the content of consciousness as a phenomenological foundation to search for the subjective meaning of human action, starts from the idea of intersubjectivity only announced by Husserl with regard to the conception that consciences share the same world and



apprehend it from different perspectives, which opens up possibilities for developing a phenomenology of social relations.

The second principle deals with the relationship between the subject and thing / object / phenomenon, provoked by researcher, which is always an intentional relationship, because consciousness is always the awareness of something, of something external to the subject that is apprehended by conscience. Consciousness moves towards things which imposes, in our view, the following question: in the movement of apprehension of the object, can it subsume through the contamination of pre-concepts projected by subjects and lose their autonomy? Husserl replies, according to Schutz (2012), that no, because the object must have its own autonomy to become the object of consciousness. It is impossible to dissolve the object in consciousness, consciousness is not a receptacle, consciousness and the world arise simultaneously. It is a consciousness that moves and apprehends fragments of the world. In this movement, consciousness positions things, it is, therefore, positional consciousness. This principle is fundamental for the understanding of senses of educational practice, since the intentionality of consciousness is what reveals the sense of the world for a given consciousness. Based on that principle, we seek through the interview, in a block that we call a relational block, to apprehend the meaning attributed by educators, to human and material elements. In data analysis, we use content analysis a posteriori, as we understand that the meaning is of the other and, in a phenomenological-interpretative perspective, the empirical field is a field of problematization and not verification. The results point to different and similar perspectives. We observe there the presence of subjective intersubjectivity, as it is crossed by representation, in Husserlian terms, and by the biography of each one, in Schutzian terms. So, in the research relationship there is a shared world, both by the researched and by the researcher, there is no hierarchical relationship up to that point. The researcher's task consists, precisely, in the exercise of "looking through a magnifying glass". Looking imbued with theory and method, so that in an attitude of otherness, you can see through the eyes of the other, therefore the importance, during analysis process, to be attentive to the manifest content, expressed in the item Indicator, of conceptual matrix, of content analysis.

This passage leads us to think about the researcher's posture, in relation to the informants. He wonders: How is knowledge constituted? In response, we start from the hypothesis that there is a discontinuous temporal space reality; there is the subject, the consciousness that moves, it approaches this reality, because it knows that things exist outside it and, from this encounter between consciousness and the thing, the phenomenon is born. Each phenomenon, then, is a system of meanings and, therefore, I can read educational practice scientifically as a system of meaning. Thus, in order to investigate consciousness in its capacity to produce meaning, it is necessary: 1st: Make



the informant look at the object / phenomenon in a reflective way, which consists of thinking about his experience, turning to his subjective acts and what appears is the intended object, the idea you have of it; 2nd Step: Reveal the intentionality of conscience in direct relationship with the intended object, which is only possible with phenomenological reduction, which consists in restraining the judgment we have about the thing and putting it out of flow of life and, in this movement, the thing moves to the flow of experience, to the awareness of something, whose space and time do not correspond to the space time of reality.

Regarding the idea of intersubjectivity, Schutz seeks in Weber, more specifically in *The Theory of Social Action*, the bases for thinking about the social meaning, meaning behind the action and guides it, hence the idea of other selves (family, work, religion) derivatives of social relation. The possibility of understanding social action in an interpreted way, as an action endowed with meaning, implies a situation in which the person who acts gives meaning to his action and gives it a certain direction which makes it a “rational action”. In those terms, the subject knows all the factors which involve the action and makes it social by being directed to the conduct of other and by taking it as a reference.

[...]Weber defined a social relationship as the conduct of several people who, given a certain context of meanings, address and orient themselves in relation to each other, it depends “complex and exclusively” on social action to occur in a significantly predictable way (WAGNER apud SCHUTZ, 2012, p.20).

On the relationship between the social interpretation of conduct and individual guidance, that is, on the relationship between the external group and the internal group respectively, Schutz (2012) tells us that the individual acts according to the internal custom that is accepted as natural because it has already been tested by others and, even by itself, needs no explanation, from which it is concluded that one can plan in terms of typification

[...] the social world in which man is born and in which he needs to find his way is experienced by him as a narrow network of social relations, systems of signs and symbols, with his particular structure of meanings, of institutionalized forms of social organization, of status and prestige systems, etc. The meaning of all those elements of social world in all their diversity and stratifications, as well as the pattern of their own texture, is always taken for granted (SCHUTZ, 2010, p.92)

Schutz (2012) criticizes the notion of rational action, as he understands that the conscience does not know all factors involved in the action, real and potential, and that the subject acts based on probabilities. Thus, it brings the notion of reasonable action, as it understands that there are flaws in practical knowledge, in execution of action; the relevance changes during the execution of action.



The subject can plan, in terms of typification, according to the tradition “it already worked once, we can repeat it”, however, depending on the relevance, the result can be different. However, thinking habitually as something continuous, requires some assumptions:

- (1) that life, and especially social life, continues to be what it was before, that is, that the same problems which require the same solutions will continue to occur and, therefore, that our previous experiences will continue to watch over to deal with future situations; (2) as long as we can trust the knowledge that has been transmitted to us by our parents, teachers, governors, traditions, habits etc., even if we do not understand its origin and its real meaning; (3) that in the course of the chores of ordinary life it is sufficient to know just a little about the general type or style of events that we may encounter in our world of life, so that we can manage or control them; (4) that neither the revenue systems as schemes of interpretation and expression, nor the basic assumptions just mentioned are only part of our personal sphere, but that they are accepted and applied by all our contemporaries (SCHUTZ, 2012, p. 94)

I can think of the relationship between researcher and members who are part of a particular educational practice. The external group, of which the researcher is a member, must pay attention to how the members of the internal group see themselves in the group, what assumptions guide their conduct, their action, how to get him to be an “outside spectator”, to think about his action so that, as a researcher, he can observe the behavior patterns prevalent in the group. The internal group makes a self-interpretation and the researcher, a member of external group, interprets it and, in this interpretive effort, can reinforce stereotypes, preconceptions. The researcher has to be careful when he finds the self of other strange, which for him is natural; when interpreting this self, the investigator has to be as faithful as possible, to the meaning of other. At that moment, the problem of the other arises for the researcher because he often begins to investigate fragments of a world in which he participates, directly or indirectly.

Living in the social world, we live with and for other individuals by whom we guide our daily activity. By experiencing them as “the others”, as consortium members or contemporaries, predecessors or successors, by linking with them in common to operate and effect, by instigating them and being instigated by them to take positions, we understand the behavior of those other individuals and we assume that they understand ours. It is built for us in those acts of interpretation and position of meaning, in different degrees of anonymity, in greater or lesser experiential proximity, in various perspectives of apprehension that intersect, the meaning structure of the social world, which is both ours (strictly speaking, first of all: my world) as well as that of other individuals (SHUTZ, 2018, p. 28)

We then have the world experienced by the researcher is the object of interpretation in another context of meaning, the scientific context. Pursuing methodological rigor in apprehending



the meaning of other about the educational practice which he experiences is a basic task of the researcher.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In phenomenology of everyday life, people place themselves in life with their anguish and concerns, in intersubjectivity with their peers and this constitutes social existence and, thus, space and time are the present life and face-to-face relationship. There is a world, people have a natural attitude towards that world, accepting it without questioning things and events. Consciousness functions as significant structures that give meaning to existence.

What we are going to try to capture, as a researcher, is the experience that is in the flow of consciousness / flow of internal duration, in constant transition from the here and now to a new here and now. To capture the structure of the respondent's experience, it is necessary for the respondent to reflect on it and what we apprehend is the movement that has already completed its course, because the experience in the flow of consciousness is a continuous becoming; the idea that conscience has freedom, in face of the reduction of man to predictable and manipulable laws, and it is in this movement that intuition, an immediate apprehension of reality, is felt and understood directly, without mediation. This immediate coincidence of the real is what is in the flow of internal duration, it is the *durée*. When reflecting on the experience that is “disorganized” in the flow of internal duration, the respondent uses understanding to represent, quantify, the cut of reality. Experiences exist as ongoing or already carried out processes, which we will capture, as a researcher, is the meaning of experience carried out. (SCHUTZ, 2012). To live in the flow of internal duration is to live in a continuum, in a multiplicity of events, as Husserl says: one lives in acts - whose intentionality transports from one here and now to the next (SCHUTZ, 2012). The researcher must take the researched person to the Reflective Attention Act in which he / she will perceive, via remembrance, what was the retaining modification (modification that he / she keeps, preserves some of the past experience). (SCHUTZ, 2012)

On the contributions of Sociological Phenomenology to research on educational practice, we have outlined the following possibilities: a) apprehension of educational practice as an object of consciousness, which means apprehending it in its subjective dimension; b) reflection on the role of the researcher and the researched in the research relationship, taking the empirical field as a field of problematization; c) refinement of data production and analysis instruments; d) enhancement of research as a process. It is about seeking the meaning of experience, investigating the conscience of other, taking as a reference the meaning that the subject attributes to his experience.



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