Non-Affirmative Curriculum Theory in a Cosmopolitan Era?

Michael Uljens*

Abstract

National curriculum making and curriculum theory are challenged by globally growing political, economic and technological interdependencies, transnational homogenization and aggregation processes. In addition increasing pluralisms within nation states present new topics to be solved. These issues are not new from an education theory perspective. A task and contribution in modern education has been a concept explaining how e.g. socialization (social cohesion) and personalization (individuation) may be considered as integrated rather than excluding processes. The modern, or classic, approach early identified dilemmas connected to a reproduction- and transformation oriented curricula, as well as dilemmas emanating from descriptive-technological and normative theory. This article elaborates on relational core concepts developed in nineteenth century modern education theory (Fichte, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Herbart, Snellman). Utilizing concepts from modern education theory a non-affirmative position is argued for as an answer to parts of contemporary challenges.

Keywords: curriculum theory, recognition, cosmopolitanism, normativity

* Chair Professor (2003-) in General education and educational leadership at Åbo Akademi University, Finland. E-mail: michael.uljens@abo.fi
Homepage: www.vasa.abo.fi/users/muljens/default.htm
Teoria Curricular não Afirmativa numa Era Cosmopolita?

Resumo

A construção de um currículo nacional e a teoria de currículo são desafiadas por uma crescente interdependência global política, econômica e tecnológica, e por processos de homogeneização e agregação transnacional. Além disso, pluralismos crescentes no âmbito de cada Estado-nação trazem novos tópicos para serem repensados. Estes problemas não são novos numa perspectiva da teoria da educação. A teoria e a prática da educação moderna tem procurado descobrir um conceito de educação que explique, por exemplo, como a socialização (coesão social) e a personalização (individuação) podem ser considerados como processos integradores ao invés de excluintes. Este artigo discorre sobre conceitos fundamentais desenvolvidos na teoria da educação moderna do século XIX (FICHTE, HEGEL, SCHLEIERMACHER, HERBART, SNELLMAN), como esta tradição tem evitado desde o seu início dilemas ligados a currículos orientados para reprodução e transformação, bem como dilemas que emanem de teorias descritivo-tecnológicas ou teorias normativas. Utilizando conceitos fundamentais da teoria da educação moderna, é defendida uma posição não-afirmativa como resposta a alguns desafios contemporâneos.

Palavras-chave: teoria do currículo, reconhecimento, cosmopolitismo, normatividade.

¿Teoría Curricular no Afirmativa en una Era Cosmopolita?

Resumen

La construcción de una teoría curricular nacional y la teoría curricular son desafiadas por una creciente interdependencia global política, económica y tecnológica, y los procesos de homogeneización y de agregación transnacionales. Además, el aumento del pluralismo dentro de cada Estado-nación aporta nuevos temas a ser repensados. Estos problemas no son nuevos en la perspectiva de la teoría de la educación. La teoría y la práctica de la educación moderna ha tratado de encontrar un concepto de educación que explique, por ejemplo, como la socialización (cohesión social) y la personalización (individualización) puede considerarse como procesos de integración en lugar de exclusión. Este artículo describe los conceptos básicos desarrollados en la teoría de la educación moderna en el siglo XIX (FICHTE, HEGEL, SCHLEIERMACHER, HERBART, SNELLMAN), cómo esta tradición ha evitado desde el inicio sus dilemas vinculados a currículos orientados para reproducción y transformación, así como los dilemas que emanan de las teorías descriptivas y tecnológicas o teorías normativas. Usando conceptos básicos de la teoría de la educación moderna se aboga por una posición no-afirmativa en respuesta a algunos desafíos contemporáneos.

Palabras clave: teoría curricular, reconocimiento, cosmopolitismo, normatividad.
Introduction

Three topics are globally relevant concerning how curriculum and education theory and practice can or should be related to the individual, the society and the future. These are: a) the relation between education and (cultural) identity, b) the relation between education and economy (or the labor market), and c) the relation between education and politics. As questions they reflect core topics discussed not only within curriculum theory and other social, cultural and political sciences but within all cultures and political systems in the world. Acknowledging an increasing diversity within contemporary nation states as well as growing parallel political, economic and technological interdependencies and changes between these, in addition to transnational homogenization and aggregation processes, underscores the importance of these issues.

However, these processes do not in themselves include educational answers to the dilemmas. In addition, answers to the above three questions above have often been framed through a nation state lens. A tradition to theorize curriculum and policy borrowing with reference to the nation state appears to lack a conceptual analytics for handling contemporary shapes and forms of cosmopolitanism and transnational themes, organizations and political and economic aggregations (SAHLBERG, 2015; SCHMIDT, 2011; SEPPÄNEN et al. 2015; STEINER-KHAMS, 2004). Yet, this mostly policy oriented literature is not always explicit concerning the heritage of Western education by which we live. In curriculum theory, on the other hand, this tradition is much more present (AUTIO, 2013; ENGLUND, 2006; HOPMANN, 2015; PINAR, 2011, SOUSA, 2015) as also in educational philosophy (KEMP, 2005; ROTH & BURBULES, 2007; BIESTA, 2008). Still, there are fundamental concepts like Bildsamkeit, summons to self-activity and recognition, by which modern education theory renewed the scene during the Romantics that have not until recently been the topic for much discussion in relation to contemporary curriculum theory and citizenship education in English (ULJENS, 2002; OETTINGEN, 2006; SILJANDER, KIVELÄ & SUTINEN, 2008; FRIESEN & SÆVI, 2010; FRIESEN & HAMELOCK, 2012; HORLACHER, 2015; SCHAFFAR & ULJENS, 2015; SAEVEROT, 2016).

Despite ongoing globalization processes the nation state has not disappeared. On the contrary, neo-conservative movements at least all over Europe, US and Russia have strengthened the idea of the nation state and weakened the role of transnational aggregations. Nation-states today find themselves in a renewed global context, challenged to find out and support curriculum making and building an education system capable of supporting societal cohesion without delimiting individual liberties crucial for political democracy, cultural, religious and ethnic plurality as well as an economy building upon individual initiatives (BELAND & PETERSEN, 2015; WILKINSON & PICKET, 2009). Even organizations such as the OECD have, since more than two decades, realized and discussed the risks with neoliberal policies for social cohesion (OECD, 1997). However, while increasing pluralities within nation states point to a growing need for a common foundation, this very same plurality seems to make it difficult to achieve. How constitute unity in increasingly pluralist societies? By instituting democratic values, a common language, a school for all or by a differentiated school system?

From a curriculum theory perspective the question is how such a theory may avoid being identical with the prevailing ideology or representing an ideologically opposite position to a politically agreed curriculum. In either case curriculum theory would function as an instrument for either positive socialization or as a counter-hegemonic ideological discourse. Although educational theory is never value neutral there is reason to keep up the difference between politics and educational theory. Is there a third way?

The questions and the modern heritage in education

Curriculum theory has taken many shapes over the years and defined its object of research and task differently (HOPMANN, 2015; ULJENS & YLIMAKI, 2015). In this study two relations are assumed to be crucial for any
curriculum theory. They are, first, how a theory specifies the relation between education and other societal practices including economy, culture, politics, media and, second, how a curriculum theory explains human interaction and influence. Both relations are fundamental for many disciplines but in curriculum theory they must be approached from a truly educational perspective. Many philosophies have indeed developed as answers to the above questions. To the extent these answers have not been done with an educational eye, i.e. thinking them through pedagogically, their educational value is often limited.

Concerning the relation between education and e.g. politics, this approach accepts a non-hierarchical position on the relation between societal forms of practice, thus holding to a western democratic tradition of citizenship and social transformation. Concerning the second problem on educational interaction, a non-affirmative approach is advanced (BENNER, 1991, ULJENS, 2007, ULJENS & YLIMAKI, 2015). For this purpose some concepts and theoretical configurations originally initiated and developed in early German, and also Finnish, nineteenth century education theory (e.g. Bildsamkeit, summoning to self-activity, recognition). Early on this theorizing provided openings for how to move beyond traditional dichotomies such as between a reproduction- and transformation oriented curriculum, between a descriptive-instrumental and normative approach to teaching and curriculum work as well as between focusing either on teaching contents or generic skills (BENNER, 1995; ULJENS, 1997).

The establishment of modern educational theory between 1760-1830, from Rousseau to Kant and Fichte, Hegel, Schleiermacher and Herbart may be seen as a response to the shift from a premodern, tradition-based and reproduction-oriented society towards a view according to which the future is radically open. The subject was from now on to be educated towards a future that in principle was not knowable. In the nineteenth century, the pre-modern teleological view of the world as created by God and heading towards its own end was replaced by a non-teleological view of both history and individual development. In Christian theology the mundane process of Bildung was about developing an innate potentiality or image in order to be prepared for eternal life. J.A. Comenius is a well-known representative of this view in his Didactica Magna in 1657, although his contribution was somewhere else (SCHALLER, 1995; SOUSA, 2015). Later, when the future was seen as dependent on our own activities, based on autonomous thinking, rather than dictated by given, external norms or directed by some innate developmental patterns, a new kind of Self and self-awareness was required. The modernist discourse on Bildung met this need when as a cosmological teleology and nativism was abandoned.

A most obvious expression of the growing belief in the possibilities of science was naturally the promotion of the idea of education as a science of its own by Herbart. As modern education theory assumed a non-teleological view of history and future, the question that continuously had to be answered was “what does the older generation want with the younger” (Schleiermacher)? A given answer to that question no longer existed, according to Schleiermacher, and therefore had to be the topic for an ongoing public discussion. As no objective values existed the growing individual had to be prepared, through education, and learn to live with the question of the good life as an open question that can never be definitely answered. The idea was to develop subjects that by themselves were oriented towards, and wanted to do, good. Moral education could no longer be a question of leading the child to a given or positive morality. Rather the child had to be led to the question of morality itself.

**Reproductive, transformative and non-affirmative curriculum theory**

Curriculum theory deals with value questions related to ethics and politics, not least as the discussion about educational aims is connected to ethics and politics. A widespread misinterpretation of Herbart’s pedagogy is that ethics provides education with aims while the task of psychology is to provide education with knowledge relevant for the methods of teaching. However,
as observed above, in modern education theory the aims cannot be derived from ethics as the individual is born neither good nor bad, nor is ethical objectivism taken seriously. Moral thinking is rather something to be learned. In modern education theory education is not subordinated to ethics, politics or psychology. If it were, the only remaining question would be from where and from whose ethics and politics the aims are to be derived. Generally taken, throughout history we have seen two such normative positions: (a) in pre-modern thinking education is equated with normative socialization and the ideals for education stem from the values and practices of contemporary society, and (b) according to reformatory or transformative theories the ideals for education stem from how we envision the future of society (ULJENS, 2007).

Pre-modern thought (a) sees education as being located within the existing society or culture. This socialization-oriented model of education emphasizes the task of education as preparing the individual for an existing society and culture wherein societal practices and norms function as the guiding principles. In this model, educational is subordinated societal practices. Education does not have any developmental or transformative role with respect to the existing society, but is rather preparatory in character. The power of societal transformation lies beyond education, and as a consequence, education is reduced to socialization.

Second, in contrast to the reproduction-oriented model, since Rousseau, we are familiar with the idea of education as (b) a revolutionary, reformatory or transformative force with respect to societal practices. In its most radical form, revolutionary or transformation-oriented education is not only disconnected from society, but also allows itself to be positioned as super-ordinate with respect to societal interests. According to Rousseau, there is no idea in educating individuals for an existing society, since this would only reproduce unacceptable constellations. Rather, the role of education would be to develop something new, something which does not yet exist. Education would work towards ideals, which may, in the future, become realities as a new generation enters society after having undergone education. In this model, education is super-ordinate with respect to societal interests a view often shared by critical pedagogy, as in the works of Henri Giroux and Peter McLaren, but in principle accepted by all education theories that propose determined, normative ideals about how the future should be. These theories do not place any critical distance to the values and norms they themselves represent.

Often socializatory and transformative curriculum models, regardless if they are politically conservative, radical or counter-hegemonic, are considered to represent an opposite or radically different position compared to descriptive-instrumental models (TYLER, 1949). However, the normative character of socializatory and transformative curriculum models often go well with technological instrumentalism: to the extent values and norms are given or predetermined, as they are in both models above, the task for education is to fulfill these pre-determined ideals as efficiently as possible.

A third line of reasoning opposes the above-mentioned ones by criticizing them for their normative nature (ULJENS, 2007). Both the reproduction and the transformation-oriented models are normative in the sense that what is either valuable or ideal in society is decided upon in advance. Therefore, it is supposed that the previous models, taken seriously, run the risk of indoctrination and of turning education, curriculum work and teaching, into a technological profession where results are related to values external to the profession and practice. Another problem with the previously described models is that they do not leave room for developing the principal’s, teacher’s or learner’s ability to decide upon what is to be considered valuable and meaningful. Pushed to an extreme, these approaches do not prepare the individual for self-reflective decision making about the future in a democratic society. Given that the future is thought to be undetermined and the question of morality something that cannot ultimately be decided upon in advance, the individual’s reflective ability – autonomy, self-awareness and self-determination - is seen as an ability which must be developed.
In this last model, education is seen in a non-hierarchical relation to politics, culture and economy. Education is not solely placed either “outside” or “inside” society and is thus neither super- nor subordinated with respect to politics, economy and culture, but intends to mediate between these. In this non-hierarchical conceptualization, educational institutions are given relative independence with respect to societal and other interests. It is this space that both allows for and requires reflective, professional educational leaders on each level of the education system. Discursive institutionalism offers a language for explicating these discursively established spaces (ULJENS & YLIMAKI, 2015).

It should be observed that a non-hierarchical understanding accepts that hegemonic political interests influence education, but recognizes that if the curricular policy and practice would be reduced in the service of some political ideology, it would be in conflict with principles for democratic education. Thus, political democracy requires a specific form of critical curriculum work, including a relative independence for educational practitioners guaranteed by the political system itself.

From a non-hierarchical perspective, education is allowed and presupposed to critically examine the political system and interests within which it operates, but it also leaves room for politics to be reflective and critical about contemporary education and curriculum. The same relation occurs between education and economics: education must prepare individuals for an existing working life, but in such a way that the individual may transcend existing ways of working.

The reason to why non-affirmative pedagogy reminds of pragmatism (Dewey), neo-pragmatism and deliberative democracy (HABERMAS, 1996) consist of their common roots. Both positions argue that there is an interdependent relation between education and politics. Also deliberative democracy requires individuals capable of participation in such a democracy. However, from a non-affirmative education theory perspective, a theory of how deliberative democracy works is something else than a theory of educational preparing for participation in such a democracy. If this distinction is not identified there is a risk of ending up in socialization pedagogy again, now with deliberative democracy as the directing norm. Education theory would then be about drawing implications and developing prescriptive recommendations for how teaching should be organized.

In conclusion, this last position represents a so-called non-affirmative position with respect to norms (see e.g. BENNER, 2005, ULJENS, 2002). This means that existing knowledge, values or ideals are definitely taken seriously but not affirmed. Non-affirmative education also means then, in the pedagogical situation, to focus on the questions to which existing practices, norms or knowledge is seen as an answer. Through this the learner is thought to acquire a relation not only to given answers (positive knowledge), but also to the questions behind the answers. Of equal importance is the ability to learn to formulate new answers to old questions as well as new questions to be answered.

Affirmative education means that the practitioner confirms, in a rather unproblematic fashion, either the present situation or the learners’ life-world, or the aims and content of schooling, reflecting the contemporary needs of society. Affirming a given reality, given values or future ideals can mean to uncritically relate one’s professional practice to these. A version of affirmative teaching would have to be concerned with an expectation that learners absorb the given content of teaching, without teachers paying attention to the fact that curricular content in educational settings primarily serves as an example or means to support the development of principled insight, something for which the content is exemplary as such.

An affirmative attitude ends up having a fundamental dilemma: to the extent that aims are given and accepted, educational leadership and teaching is expected to follow a technical rationale. Such a (Tyler) rationale measures quality in terms of efficiency and efficacy.

**Recognition and other core concepts**

If one accepts a non-hierarchical relation between e.g. education and politics a corresponding notion of curricu-
lum work and teaching must be developed. The position outlined here draws on the seminal studies of German, modern education theory and later developments thereof. In this tradition of general pedagogy the concepts (a) recognition, (b) summons to self-activity, and (c) Bildsamkeit traditionally occupy a central position (BENNER, 1991; MOLLENHAUER, 2014). These concepts are considered fundamental for the post-Kantian pedagogy of which the main outlines were drawn by Fichte, Herbart, Hegel, and Schleiermacher among others.

**Recognition**

The solutions presented deal with how to solve the pedagogical paradox. For example, in Plato's philosophy what makes teaching meaningful for learning is not that external information is communicated to the learner but rather that the learner reaches insight that he or she already possesses (nativism). To learn is, thus, paradoxically, to attain something one already possesses. Also for Kant (1992) education was paradoxical: How may education, in the sense of external influence (coercion), support autonomy of thought and action? Differently expressed, modern education theory typically views education as an invitation or a provocation to self-reflection and autonomy. However, in order for the individual to reach autonomy in self-reflection abilities, he or she must, according to this line of reasoning, already be recognized as autonomous, free and self-reflecting (SCHAFFAR & ULJENS, 2015). In other words, in order for education to be possible, there must exist a free subject whose reflection is provoked, but simultaneously it is thought that the individual becomes a free subject through the process triggered by an educational provocation. In order for education to be possible the individual must be free and self-active, and simultaneously, in order for the individual to become free and self-active, education seems to be necessary.

From a Kantian transcendental philosophy of freedom it is, however, difficult to show how the Other constitutes the necessary element it proves to be in practice. Siljander (2007) draws attention to that Herbart’s contribution was to introduce the idea of pedagogical causality to overcome the antimony between freedom and coercion, between the causality of nature and the causality of freedom. A crucial step was taken in that J. G. Fichte in 1796 developed a critique of Kant’s way of explaining self-consciousness of freedom by referring to awareness of the moral law (FICHTE, 1992). In doing this Kant thereby assumed, a priori, an intersubjective life-world. Thus, Fichte’s innovation was to realize that consciousness of freedom was in fact intersubjectively mediated by the empirical Other. Here the Self becomes aware of itself as free (experiences herself as free) by reference to the Other, i.e. by being recognized and treated by another as having the potentiality to move beyond her present state (ULJENS, 2002; WILLIAMS, 1997). In Benner’s (1991) formulation of this position education would, then, be to recognize somebody as if he or she is already capable of doing what he or she is supposed to become capable of - and to act accordingly (Fichte, Herbart, Schleiermacher). The concept of recognition was developed further by Hegel and has influenced many later developments in education and learning theory, especially Dewey, Vygotsky and Mead. In addition to defining recognition as a mutual assumptional acceptance of each other’s freedom Fichte simultaneously introduces the concept summons to self-activity. Both recognition and a summons to self-activity are fundamental categories for understanding that the empirical freedom is intersubjectively mediated. The subject’s empirical autonomy and experience of himself or herself as a being of free will, is partly made dependent on the empirical Other, a position that Hegel develops further and which today constitutes the reference point for e.g. Charles Taylor’s and Axel Honneth’s studies on recognition. Fichte’s contribution includes the notion that the subject’s potentiality for so called culturally productive freedom can be realized solely through a summons to such freedom (Aufforderung). This means that the already immediately and originally self-aware and object-aware subject who encounters the world (in the world!) can “be summoned to free self-activity”. This summons, on the one hand, promotes the establishment of “cultural intersubjectivity,” and personal identity (empirical identity). Pedagogically this means that educators/teachers direct their own and the students’ attention toward the relation between the students’ psychological experiential structure and cognitive logics or ethical and political dimensions of the contents.
In the following, the aim is to present and open up the relation between recognition, summons to self-activity, and Bildsamkeit.

**Bildsamkeit and summoning to free self-directed activity**

While ‘summoning’ may be seen as a teacher’s invitation of the learner to become engaged in a self-constituting and self-transcending process, Bildsamkeit refers to those conscious efforts through which individuals aim at making sense of the world and their experiences, given the summoning. The point is thus that this summons to free self-activity contributes to the establishment of a shared and mutual sphere, or a space wherein the subject may come to see the world in another light. The principle of Bildsamkeit, then, also means that the learner is recognized as a subject with a current potentiality for self-transcendence. But this potentiality is realized by the learner in and through the pedagogical space that is created through the summons to self-activity. The principle of Bildsamkeit refers to individual’s own processing of one’s experiences – ones relation to the world, others and oneself – through their own activity (BENNER, 1991, 2005; ULJENS, 2002). Pedagogical activity or summons to self-activity, then, means that the subject’s potentiality for empirical freedom and world-relations are recognized (the principle of recognition, Anerkennung) and then intervened by a pedagogical act so that learners become aware of themselves as free to make use of their autonomy to become and develop as cultural beings.

This reasoning emphasizes that self-understanding in a wide sense is essentially dependent on social recognition, as for instance Honneth (2005) argues, while social recognition does not determine anything. If the individual’s self-image is dependent on and is established through interaction with others, and if these dimensions of self are viewed as rights, it follows that pedagogical activity can be viewed as a response to the moral and political demands resulting from the recognition of these rights. The self is thus simultaneously both free and dependent, both as regards itself and others. Therefore, it is apt to say that the continuous self-forming (Bildung) process is about having learned to answer continuous questions of who I am, what I can do, know, and want.

It may be good to observe that pedagogues in their summons cannot exclusively presuppose a shared life-world or some form of mutuality (symmetry) between the Self and the Other (intersubjectivity) as a starting point for education. Symmetry, or the negation of asymmetry, in the form of establishing a shared life-world, is rather something that is sought after to make real through the pedagogical process. But also the opposite is true. In their summons of the learner, teachers cannot exclusively take for granted there being a radical difference (asymmetry) between the Self and the Other, partly because corporeal intersubjectivity is accepted and partly because an asymmetry (individualization) is, in fact, something which is sought through the pedagogical process. A “sought-for asymmetry,” that is, the negation of symmetry, refers to the aim of the pedagogical process, namely that the individual develops uniqueness in a cultural sense, a uniqueness that did not originally exist.

**Non-affirmative summons**

As seen, non-affirmative summons involves a critique of both socializing and normative education. In accordance with this, in, for instance, emancipatory pedagogy, also called critical pedagogy, pedagogues tend to think they know and have the right to decide what students should be liberated for. A non-affirmative summons to self-activity highlights that the education process is dependent on an experiential address, but that when this provocation is a pedagogical the pedagogue consciously refrains from naively confirming either a prevailing or ideal future condition. With such a self-reflecting pedagogical discernment the pedagogue is thought to be better able to create a space for an education process that recognizes the learner’s self-activity and right to exercise conscious independence of thought. Non-affirmative education that seeks to allow the learner to identify and deal with those problems to which existing knowledge is the answer (and also to assess the value of the existing problems) thus aim at preventing or restricting learners from unreflectingly dedicate to themselves cultural content, practices, specific skills or concepts. In this limited sense
education is about hindering learning. A pedagogical activity which is educationally reflective presupposes that the school as a social institution is allowed enough free space for the establishment of necessary pedagogical fields of action in relation to other social interests.

With respect to the dichotomy between curriculum models emphasizing either learning of contents as such or curriculum models emphasizing learning of generic skills or concepts, a non-affirmative position would start from not affirming any of these ambitions as such. Instead, the educational activity would aim at working on the relation between the above curricular aims in connection to the learner’s experiences. In non-affirmative theory learning contents always also aims beyond itself. Working on the contents aims at a cultivation of more general capacities (self-concept, will, moral reasoning, identity, etc.) but also at identifying the principled meaning that a specific content exemplifies (KLAFKI, 1997). That is, the modern tradition holds that selection and treatment of contents should also serve educative purposes beyond learning the subject matter itself (for Herbart’s ‘educative teaching’ see SILJANDER, 2007; SOMR & HRUŠKOVÁ, 2014). Learning generic skills or knowledge in turn occurs through working with contents, but focusing on generic knowledge can also work as a selection criterion for choosing curricular contents. Here the teacher’s task is to extrapolate the educative power or qualities (Bildungsgehalt) of the selected contents (Bildungsinhalt). Young (2010) arrives at a similar conclusion from a social realist epistemology.

**Concluding reflections**

One of the cornerstones of modern pedagogy is the notion that autonomy (Mündigkeit) is the highest objective of education – discerning thought and action as regards issues of both knowledge and values. According to Herbart, moral freedom means following the reflected will, not acting conventionally from impulse or emotion. Consequently, education consists in the summoning of the Other to reflect over, for instance, the reasonableness of one’s own will in relation to others and to the interests of others. Educating the will is then about the cultivation of discernment with the help of reason.

Modern educational thought reformulated the pre-modern pedagogical paradox. It was no longer about helping the learner to connect to innate knowledge as Plato had argued for, i.e. to reach knowledge that was already given, nor was it about the paradox of being created in God’s image (1 Moses 26-27) and yet standing before the task of fulfilling this “likeness”. According to the Judeo-Christian doctrine, human beings are in need of maturing and becoming worthy of His image, while at the same time it is forbidden to make any image of Him (cf. the Ten Commandments). This movement, to strive for something that one cannot picture in advance (Meister Eckhart), has since been a crucial dilemma of Bildung (SCHAFFAR & ULJENS, 2015). Modern non-teleological cosmology, with an open future meets the same problem – how to educate for a future we cannot know. And second, if the individual is not pre-determined but always a stranger I cannot reach, how should I educate? The non-affirmative alternative argues that the growing individual is treated as though he or she is already capable of doing that to which he or she is summoned, and as someone who realizes his or her empirical freedom through his or her activity (BENNER, 1991). In this case, recognition is not only about recognizing a specific ability or competence, but about behaving toward the Other in an opportunity-identifying way. When Herbart refers to the concept pedagogical tact the intention is to demonstrate that summons not only falls back on the recognition of the freedom of the Other or the Other as worldly subject, but that summons must, in order to work, be experienced as reasonable by the Other. Through such a thought-provoking but sensitive activity, the educator recognizes the subject’s empirical reality, life situation, as well as his or her self-expression and potentiality. However, nothing of this is affirmed, but rather challenged. Education more often aims at creating headache, rather than to cure it.

The non-affirmative position (BENNER, 1991) outlined in this article must be further discussed but this theorizing shows that we in our educational theory tradition find ideas how to avoid the dichotomies between conservative reproduction oriented and normative transformation
oriented curriculum theory, as well as descriptive-technological approaches to teaching and curriculum work.

As we have seen from the above, curriculum theory cannot be limited to dealing with a theory of Bildung alone, but must explicitly and in parallel deal with a theory of education (pedagogical influence) leading us to different versions of the pedagogical paradox. Finally, it is the hope that this study has demonstrated that the two levels of curriculum theory, i.e. those between institutional education and politics, culture and economy, as well as the interactional level, have been considered crucial for the past two hundred years.

The nation-states face new dilemmas both in their external relations and internal conditions. ‘Globalization’ has brought cosmopolitism back on the agenda after about two hundred years of constructing independent, legal states (Rechtsstaat) based on some concept of collective nationhood, often invented around language, formal equity of citizens and history (LEWELLEN, 2002). What is needed today is a renewed and extended discussion on cosmopolitism and the modern, Hegelian educational heritage (e.g. BRINCAT, 2009; MOLAND, 2011). As a topic cosmopolitism has reoccurred many times in European history, but always in new constellations and with new motives. We know that in their reaction against the aristocratic society both Kant and Herbart proposed cosmopolitanism as an ideal. “Das Weltbeste”, (KANT, 1915), the best for the world, rather than private or national interests, was to be the aim of education (PERANDER, 1883).

We know cosmopolitan thinking never transformed itself into the curricula of nation-state public schools. Rather, Fichte’s critique of Kant came to fuel Hegelianism. As we have seen, this tradition established valuable concepts that do not appear outdated. Rather, a non-affirmative approach to curriculum can constitute a foundation to be used against increasing neo-conservative movements within the nation states, i.e. nationalisms. The non-affirmative position protects or saves educational practice and theory as critical instances and institutions both with regards to tradition, economy and politics, thereby supporting deliberative democracy and reflective politics. Yet, we must ask if the Hegelian heritage provides us with all we need for understanding education in our empirical cosmopolitan era.

References


Received in 16 de janeiro de 2016. Accepted in 25 de fevereiro de 2016.