

GLOBALISING BRAZILIAN HISTORY: THE CASE OF D. JOÃO VI IN BRAZIL

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The transfer of the Portuguese Royal Court, headed by Dom João VI, from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1807/08 constitutes a unique episode in the history of European empires. No sovereign had ever visited his colonies, let alone therein constructed a new capital of the empire. Whereas this is an essential event, if not the foundation stone in Brazilian national historiography, it is quite safe to say that it remains in large part unknown to the international academic community. Outside Brazil, very few historians have dedicated themselves to interpreting the extraordinary shift of political power from one continent to another.[2] The reason for this lies in the function the narrative fulfils in the historiography of the Luso-Brazilian Empire. It is usually told as a national story, inexorably linked to the destiny of the Brazilian state, to the construction of a Brazilian national culture, and especially to Brazilian independence in 1822.

However, what if the story of the Court's transfer is more adequately understood when placed in broader contexts? In my article, I will argue that an episode seemingly interesting only for Brazilianists can perfectly be embedded within the era which has recently been called the era of the "first global crisis" (ca. 1780–1840) and thus contribute to a better understanding of processes of globalisation.[3] That is to say, told in another way and from a different point of view, the national story can become a

global one. The goal of this attempt is twofold: on the one hand, it is my intention to free the episode of the transfer of the Court from its national historiographical bonds and thus make this part of Luso-Brazilian history more accessible to historians of other regions and periods. On the other hand I want to shed light on the phenomenon of “global crisis” which is debated today in the emergent field of global history.

The increasing academic interest in globalisation brought with it a growing interest in the history of multi-continental empires, more precisely an interest in the functioning – and of course failure – of imperial rule. In the aftermath of the so-called spatial turn the construction of space on a global scale, the *integration* and *disintegration* of political space, became a privileged object of study.[4] As the transfer of the Portuguese royal Court to the New World meant nothing less than an impressive shift of a seat of power from one continent to another and an extraordinary inversion between centre and periphery, it shows quite plainly the relativity and flexibility of such imperial space.[5] On this basis alone, Luso-Brazilian history offers many interesting themes and topics for the field of global history that has been gaining importance in the last two decades in Europe and the US.[6]

In the first section, I sketch some characteristics of the traditional history writing about the transfer of the Court in order to lay the ground for new interpretations. Then I briefly present the perspectives and methods of my own research on the topic.[7] In the third and fourth sections, I focus on the governance and techniques of policing – and especially on the changes therein – in the two capital cities of the Portuguese empire, Rio de Janeiro and Lisbon. Finally, I link the results of my study to the phenomenon of the “global crisis”.

Characteristics of traditional (national) interpretations of D. João in Brazil

The Joanine Period (1808–1821) has attracted the attention of many Brazilian historians. Particularly two key events, the transfer of the court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro itself and Brazilian independence, have been subject of manifest controversies, giving room to a wide range of interpretations.[8] Considering the vast amount of existing accounts, it is difficult to evaluate them as a whole; modern publications on the Joanine Period are in fact very sophisticated and differentiated.[9] However, for the

purpose of this article suffice it to stress some main characteristics of the existing historiography.

As mentioned above, the establishment of the Royal Court in Rio de Janeiro in 1808 is an essential part of Brazil's national history and identity. In academic history writing it is common to interpret the transfer as a pre-story to independence: Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen (1816–1878), the “Brazilian Herodotus” [10] and “father” of professional historiography in Brazil, in his *História Geral do Brasil* (1854–1857) described the transfer as follows: “Pelo que respeita ao Brasil, uma nova era vai abrir-se-lhe: em vez de colônia ou de principado honorário, vai ser o verdadeiro centro da monarquia”. [11] According to Varnhagen, the Bragança monarchy was the only power able to control the centrifugal forces, the *caudilhismo*, and the “barbarism” that were taking effect in the Spanish-American territories. [12] Most Brazilian historians took up this interpretation. At least the assumption that the Portuguese monarch with his decision to leave Lisbon and settle down in Rio once and for all changed Brazil's destiny as a nation state, leading the country to cultural and political emancipation, territorial unity, civilization progress, and finally to independence is quite prevalent in most accounts. [13] José Murilo de Carvalho in an article about the “histories of D. João in Brazil” recently concluded that without the transfer there would be “no Brazil” today. [14]

Not only in professional history writing but also in popular culture this version of the truth remains largely unchallenged. In 2008, the bicentenary of the transfer of the Court was enthusiastically celebrated in Rio de Janeiro. There were exhibitions and theatre plays, and most Brazilian newspapers and magazines issued special editions about the Court's arrival in the tropics. Three samba schools in the *grupo especial* (São Clemente, Mocidade, and Imperatriz Leopoldinense) picked out D. João's arrival to Brazil as a central theme for their *desfiles* in February 2008, and all of them praising the monarch as a hero. According to the *samba enredo* of “São Clemente” the arrival of the Portuguese monarch transformed the city of Rio into a “truly tropical paradise” (*verdadeiro paraíso tropical*). One of the most decisive lines was perhaps “goodbye colony, Rio is now the capital” (“Adeus colônia, pois o Rio é capital”). In an interview given to a Brazilian newspaper prior to the festivities, Cesar Maia, the then-mayor of Rio de Janeiro, called D. João the “most important carioca of all times”. [15]

It goes almost without saying that the estimations of D. João are slightly different in Portugal. After the monarch had left in November 1807, the country found itself involved a military struggle between Great Britain and France. Lisbon, deprived of its status as an imperial capital and subject to foreign military forces, lost both people and money. The Napoleonic wars were devastating.[16] Portuguese have generally considered the long absence of the Royal Court as a difficult and unpleasant period in time. Teófilo Braga (1843–1924), president of Portugal in 1910–11 and 1915, called D. João a “traitor to the fatherland” (*traidor da pátria*).[17] Largely agreeing with the thesis of the correlation between transfer and independence of Brazil,[18] Portuguese historians, too, are in general more critical of the monarch himself.[19] António Henrique de Oliveira Marques, one of the most famous contemporary Portuguese historians, said about D. João: “Não o condenemos nem reabilitemos. Lastimemo-lo somente”.[20]

No matter how the transfer of the court is judged in detail: it is most commonly closely linked to the destiny or fate of the Brazilian or Portuguese nation. Thus, the analytical framework of the nation state has prevailed in the past and continues to prevail. Jorge Pedreira stated that “historians on both shores of the Atlantic have failed to present a common perspective on basic issues” in the history of the Luso-Brazilian Empire of the early 19th century.[21] Lincoln Secco recently admitted that Brazilian historians have hardly ever been interested in Portuguese history.[22]

Herein lies a striking paradox, at least to an outside observer: despite the fact that the transfer of the Portuguese Court can well be seen as a manifestation of an extremely close *connection* between Portugal and Brazil – the transfer being at the same time result of and reason for strong political bonds – historical interpretations of this period remain divided. There are, in fact, very few studies on the Joanine Period (1808–1821) that focus on both sides of the Atlantic or, to be more precise, that build their interpretation on archival sources obtained both in Portugal *and* Brazil.[23] The fascination with the nation (traditionally a historian’s weakness) has affected the methodological approach of all interpretations from the middle of the 19th century onward, even if nations in the period under scrutiny were certainly not consolidated entities, if they hardly even existed.

Observed from a non-Brazilian perspective, it seems impressive not so much that Brazil eventually gained independence after the transfer of the Court but rather that Portuguese were able to maintain the imperial space for another 13 years after the spectacular *translatio regis* in 1807/08.

Questions deriving from the inverted perspective of an outsider are: how was it possible to shift the centre of power from one continent to another without precipitating the disintegration of imperial space? How did the Portuguese empire survive until 1821? Where and when was the empire challenged – and by whom?

New perspectives on D. João in Brazil

So how should one tell the story of D. João in Brazil in a different way? One possibility is to move beyond the national perspective and give preference to the political, that is *imperial*, space. According to Frederick Cooper, it is a rewarding task for a historian to analyse how empires “thought”:

We need to take seriously what it meant for a polity to think like an empire, to conjugate incorporation and differentiation, to confront problems of long-distance extension and recognize limits of control over large and diverse populations. Thinking like an empire was not the same as thinking like a nation-state, and while territorial and cultural conceptions of “the nation” were in some situations more powerful than in others – and at times had devastating effects – the imperative of acting like an empire-state within a global system of empire-states was a compelling constraint on the range of action.[24]

What would be, on a practical level, an adequate approach to the thoughts of an empire? It seems that there are places particularly relevant for the analysis of the Portuguese empire’s internal functioning: the two imperial capital cities Rio de Janeiro and Lisbon. Not only were these two cities closely connected by virtue of the fact that the monarch of Portugal resided in Rio, but also because that monarch continued to rule over Lisbon and Portugal. Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro were also the major ports of their respective hinterlands, and both held extraordinary political and economic importance for the rest of the territory. In both cities the circulation of goods, people, and ideas were exponentially more intensive than in other cities.[25]

There is another reason for selecting the two capital cities: the relation of cities and empires has always been ambivalent. Empires have been ruled by monarchs or emperors who resided in one or several different cities. Connections to other points within the empire usually emanated from these cities.[26] Thus, cities served as instruments for control over empires, and therefore were important components in the construction of imperial space.[27] But on the other hand cities have always been *enemies* to empires. They were places where imperial rule was questioned, doubted, contested, and defeated. Karl Marx called the Iberian revolutions of the early 19th century “city revolutions” (“Stadtrevolutionen”).[28] In Latin America, too, the movements that eventually led to independence and thereby destroyed or at least weakened the Spanish empire, started in the respective capital cities (Buenos Aires, Mexico-City, and Caracas): they were capital city phenomena.[29] Because they are places where imperial power was constantly contested, Jane Jacobs called the imperial capital the “edge of empire”. According to her, it becomes evident in the very capital city of an empire that the “great idea of the empire” consists of “unstable, fine-grained spatial technologies of power” like the planning and policing of the urban area.[30] That is to say, depending on the historical circumstances, cities can be both *centres* and *edges* of the empire, and sometimes they are both at the same time.

If the great idea of empire is reflected in the microphysics of power like the policing of its capital, as Jane Jacobs maintains, it seems appropriate and advisable to analyse the documents produced by the Police Intendancies (*Intendencias Gerais da Policia*) in Rio de Janeiro and Lisbon, in order to shed light on the daily business of governance and control.

The police was, as many scholars have pointed out, one of the most important institutions for the establishment of modern statehood as from the 17th century on.[31] According to Michel Foucault the police constituted an instrument of power in the hand of a sovereign and can be considered the most visible expression of the governmentality (*gouvernementalité*) of a state.[32] The same seems to hold true for empires. In fact, one of the first things the Portuguese Monarch did when he reached Rio de Janeiro in 1808[33] was to establish a Police Intendancy after the model of the Lisbon Police.[34] The police chief (*intendente geral da polícia*), Paulo Fernandes Vianna, subsequently became known as the “chief civiliser” of the urban area as it was he who initiated all

civilising measures concerning infrastructure, social engineering, and urban development such as the paving of streets and the installation of street lights. The police chief soon became a close counsellor of D. João and thereby represented the authority of the monarch,[35] eventually becoming one of the most important sentinels over the good order in the city.[36]

The documents produced by the Rio and Lisbon police intendancies, about 50,000 pages in total, provide information about the social interactions that took place at the time, especially about those which were considered dangerous, and about the techniques of control. Of particular interest are communications sent directly to the monarch or to ministers of state. These documents reveal what the police forces believed to be of special importance to the government (empire) writ large.

Global crisis and techniques of control in Rio de Janeiro

How did the “tropicalized” monarchy actually fare? How did the authorities guarantee the maintenance of good order in Rio de Janeiro? The police documents reveal a wide range of the capital cities’ concerns. They tell about sex and crime, adultery and rape, thievery and murder.[37] As the early modern police were also responsible for the well-being of the society, the records also refer to infrastructure, the circulation of water and foodstuff such as meat and wheat, to hygiene and trade regulations. According to the amount of citations and the relevance given to certain topics in the police records, it is possible to single out the most important problems and dangerous social interactions: In the city of Rio de Janeiro, the police considered three groups of people to pose the biggest threat to the “good order” of the city – and the empire: firstly, the revolutionary French, secondly the republican Spanish-Americans and thirdly, the slaves.

As for the first problem, the revolutionary French: in a retrospective at the end of his time in office (1821), the police chief of Rio de Janeiro stated that the most important task during his years of service had been the extinction of the “Jacobin terror” which had spread all over Latin America.[38] In fact, the police documents bear witness to great efforts undertaken by the police to combat the supposed Jacobins. While the war against Napoleon in Europe raged, French people in Brazil were persecuted for

being *qua nationality* subversive elements and for fostering the revolution in Brazil. The Police chief's explicit plan, as he stated in 1811, was to "purge" the Brazilian soil of the "French race" which he conceived of as "very dangerous".[39]

As for the second problem, the Spanish-Americans: In the eyes of the authorities, they were creators of republican chaos. The trade relations between Rio de Janeiro and the Rio de la Plata region (Buenos Aires and Montevideo) were of great economic importance at the time, and the police chief principally agreed on intensifying the commercial relationship. On the other hand, merchants coming from these Spanish dominions were frequently arrested on suspicion for being dangerous to the state.[40] The worst thing that could happen according to the police chief were "dangerous communications" with Montevideo or Buenos Aires, where rebellion against Spanish colonial rule had already started in 1810. Vianna understood that the mere idea of independence must not invade Brazilian society. Therefore foreigners were often arrested or expelled for being informants who could infect Brazilian society with revolutionary thoughts.[41]

Juan Paulino da Motta Lagosta, for instance, a man from Buenos Aires, was arrested in 1811 and eventually exiled for having had a single "loose-tongued" and "indecent" conversation (*conversação indiscreta*) about the political events in the Rio de la Plata region. Interestingly, the arrest document reveals the police chief's belief (sometimes explicitly expressed) that the mere appearance of a person from the Rio de la Plata region in the streets of the capital of the Portuguese empire and their private contact with the urban society could lead to insurrection or revolution.[42] The goal of the police as expressed in some of the documents was to eliminate all "enunciators" of the "new system".

Of course it would be naïve to assume that the police were actually able to suppress or control all communication with the revolutionary outside world. The question instead should be: why would the police pay so much attention and waste so much energy on the control of the outside contacts? What was so dangerous about one single person in Rio de Janeiro talking about a revolution in Buenos Aires? The answer is: there was an extremely high awareness of a – perceived – global crisis. The observation of and the adequate reaction to French and Spanish-American revolutionaries were considered the most important tasks of the police in Rio de Janeiro.

To put it differently: the revolutions *outside* were the only real threats to the state and society that appear in the police documents. During the time span under scrutiny, movements and processes that actually took place within Rio de Janeiro society itself or in other nearby areas never caused a “panic of sovereignty” whereas events happening in the neighbouring states and societies and at times in far distant places frequently did, whenever the idea of independence somehow was brought up.

The same holds true for the problem of slavery. The most striking difference between the old court in Lisbon and the new one in Rio was the fact that more than half of the population was enslaved. As the whole economic and social system in Brazil was dependent on slavery, there was no way to abolish this institution without destroying the monarchy.[43] Yet evenso, African slaves were, according to the police intendant, the third big threat to society. Due to their demographic superiority (he wrongly estimated the number of slaves to be 10 times greater than the white population in Brazil) they could easily start a rebellion. The police chief wanted to blight any “flame of rebellion”, and thus prevent events like those that had occurred in Santo Domingo which had eventually led to the Haitian slave revolution in 1791.[44] In short, the example of the Haitian Revolution was a terrifying vision to the authorities in Rio de Janeiro.[45]

Thus, during the stay of the Court in Rio de Janeiro the relations between slave and master, slave and state, state and master, were altered in reaction to this and to other events that took place in other parts of the world. In November 1818, the police chief reported to the minister of state, Villanova Portugal, that he had arrested a man in Rio who had served as a soldier in the La Plata region and who had publicly praised the actions of José Artigas, a general from Montevideo who was struggling for independence and who was also said to be fighting for the abolition of slavery. As the police chief stated, the troublemaker was to be exiled to Angola for he could not be allowed to “live in any part of Brazil” anymore.[46]

Just a few days later, there was a telling conflict between a woman, her female slave, and the police chief. The mistress ordered two hundred whiplashes for her slave for domestic theft, but the police insisted on giving her only hundred lashes.[47] This “leniency” is consistent with several missives the police chief sent to the monarch himself, insisting on an upper limit of lashes in slave punishment for the sake of the Brazilian economy and society.[48] It seems the police chief was reacting to abolitionist

plans in the Spanish dominions, taking the measures to protect and control the institution of slavery. In other words, the idea of reducing the number of lashes was not due to changes or rebellions that had actually occurred within Brazilian society, but to processes that were going on in *other parts* of Latin America. It was the assumption of *global validity* of certain ideas (i.e., abolition) that aroused fears of upheaval and caused the police chief to put in a plea for a reduction in the number of lashes. If the body of a slave in Rio de Janeiro was the minimum unit, the last locus of societal struggle, in this specific case it became the point of reference for the governance in the face of a (supposed) global crisis of slavery.

Most interesting to the historian, however, is what the sources do not tell. In the documents produced in Rio de Janeiro in the time between 1808 and 1820, there is no sign of conflict between European and American Portuguese subjects, despite the fact that there were about 24,000 Portuguese immigrants who came along with the monarch or in the aftermath of the transfer of the Court. The contemporary bureaucratic sources do not even distinguish between Portuguese and Brazilians. The total lack of “national” problems and competitions should be a striking proof of Frederick Cooper’s assertion that national movements were not the only (and not even the most likely) forces that could shipwreck an empire.[49]

Global crisis and techniques of control in Lisbon

What happened on the other side of the Atlantic, in Lisbon? It goes almost without saying that remaining loyal to an absolutist monarchy is a rather difficult task if the most important person, the monarch, is suddenly thousands of miles away. However, there were some precautions in place: before leaving, D. João had nominated trustworthy men as governors (*governadores*)[50] and assigned them with the task of saving the monarchy at any cost. In fact, these men tried hard to maintain things as they were before the Prince Regent had left. How did they do so?

One aspect of these attempts was a powerful and active police force that during the so-called Napoleonic Wars represented a picture of repression and persecution. Deprived of the royal Court, Lisbon was comparatively well policed: at the beginning of the 19th century there were, proportionally, three times as many policemen in Lisbon as

in Paris[51], and the Portuguese police chief Lucas Seabra da Silva was not only in charge of some thousand men, but had also established and maintained a broad denunciation system amongst civilians.[52]

The leaders of this considerable force conceived of two major threats to the good order and the “public tranquillity”: “Jacobins” and “French spies.” This later category included Portuguese as well as foreign “French factionists”, in effect almost all of the (European) foreigners were regarded as threats. Despite the fact that the structure of Lisbon society was quite different than that of Rio de Janeiro, the problems were strikingly similar. Here too, interactions between Portuguese subjects and members of other states and societies (especially Spain and Great Britain) and the flow of supposedly dangerous ideas in form of newspapers, pamphlets etc. were taken to be particularly dangerous.

In order to expel all French spies and Jacobins from the Portuguese territory, many subjects including members of the elite were banished and deported to the Terceira Island (Ilha Terceira)[53] at the slightest suspicion – most without any evidence for truly “subversive” political thoughts. Anyone who criticised the emigration of the monarch to Brazil or the *governadores*’ politics was imprisoned or thrown out of the country.[54] Talking in a public place such as a café about any political issue at all was reason enough for banishment.[55] Particularly dangerous was talk about the constitution of Cádiz (1812)[56], as the authorities took this as an offence against the monarchy and the state itself.

The signs of a “panic of sovereignty” pervade the police documents. This demonstrates that the authorities were convinced that the old absolutist (or else non-constitutional[57]) system was undergoing a deep crisis. Therefore, like in Rio de Janeiro, almost every single person was considered able to cause upheaval and the overthrow of the Ancien Régime.

This is not to say that the police were able to capture all “subversive” elements or to inhibit all kinds of interactions with foreigners. Rather, the very “panic of sovereignty” in the face of the perceived threat posed by individuals already shows plainly that the authorities no longer relied on the stability of the Ancien Régime. In a truly teleological manner they believed that if there was enough information available

on the “new [constitutional] system,” their own society would automatically fall victim to the temptations posed by the latest developments in neighbouring Spain and the protector Great Britain. To control and inhibit such ideas, any flows of people, books, newspapers, private letters, in short information of any sort, no matter if printed or orally transmitted, was followed closely. All individuals maintaining international contacts, especially in France and Spain, were subject to spying and harsh repression.

There is a certain irony in regards to the history of the European part of the Luso-Brazilian Empire. Generally, the breakdown of Luso-Brazilian unity in 1822 is attributed to the development of nations in Europe. However, these phenomena are never referred to as problems in the authority’s accounts. “National sentiments” and “patriotism” never triggered any worries and were, on the contrary, explicitly and emphatically fostered and deployed by the rulers in the fight against French occupation.

The police records thus tell a story that differs significantly from conventional interpretations. In the process of separating politically “dangerous” elements from the faithful Portuguese subjects and reinforcing the control over harbours and state borders, “national” origin became increasingly important. Hence, the Portuguese authorities themselves were the ones who heavily contributed to the processes of *territorialisation* and *nationalisation*. These two processes are usually considered preconditions for the emergence of modern nations. In consequence, “the nation” in the Portuguese sphere appears as an unintended by-product of the authorities’ efforts to maintain the old non-constitutional system and keep the transatlantic empire together.

Conclusion

The intention of this article was to focus on the transfer of the Portuguese Court from a different perspective looking at the events through the lens of the *empire*. To be sure, no analytical framework, be it a nation state, an empire, a region, a city or the whole globe, will ever prove to be the ultimate one. Yet, applying an alternative framework immediately brings up new topics and research questions, and eventually leads to different answers.

“Traditional” interpretations in the vast majority of the cases focus on one nation state (either Portugal or Brazil) and come to the conclusion that the most important process of the Joanine Period was the emergence of two distinct nations, namely the Brazilian nation and the Portuguese nation. In light of the evidence obtained from the police records from both sides of the Atlantic, however, things appear slightly different. “National sentiment” or “patriotism” was not conceived as a threat to the empire at all by the rulers. To read (and write) the history of the Portuguese Empire at the time through the lens of nationalism (which remains by far the predominant perspective) means missing a phenomenon which was far more important for the actions of the state actors: the global crisis of the “old system”.

Although the authorities on both sides of the Atlantic faced different problems, the measures undertaken by state agents have one important thing in common: they were responses to a perceived global crisis. Among state authorities in general and the police in particular there was a remarkable interest in the revolutionary movements, be they driven by ideas of abolition, independence or liberalism, that took place outside their own territory. The documents clearly reveal that the contacts between Portuguese subjects and members of other societies were seen with suspicion and that these interactions were conceived of as a threat to the monarchy and state.

All in all, the history of the transfer of the Portuguese royal court offers interesting insights into the making of global crises.

As for the Portuguese Empire at the beginning of the 19th century, the first step toward a global crisis was that the authorities obsessively observed events in other, most often neighbouring societies, because they considered a great crisis to be coming from outside. Even if there was no sign of upheaval domestically, techniques of governance were altered and policing measures tightened. The authorities were visibly moved by a manifest “panic of sovereignty”. This panic of sovereignty was largely due to the fact that rulers no longer considered their own political system to be natural, instead interpreting developments within other societies as a threat to their own sphere of influence. The only way they saw to prevent an overthrow was to cut off interactions with other societies.

Yet, for power to be effective it needs to be productive. If power starts to manifest itself merely in prohibitive actions, it becomes weak. Therefore, attempts to seal off and restrain were most likely steps *toward* crisis. Attempts at censorship of certain newspapers and pamphlets only increased the attention paid to these publications, posing a paradox of techniques of control.[58]

Additionally, and ironically enough, in the Luso-Brazilian case, this attempt at isolation in fact aided in the emergence of nations. So, if the break-up of Brazil and Portugal indeed followed the emergence of nationalisms or the existence of different nations, it was the rulers themselves who helped lay the foundations of those nations on both sides of the Atlantic.

With my short account I hope to have demonstrated that the history of the transfer of the Portuguese Court can be placed fruitfully in broader contexts. Thus understood, it can attract the interest not only of a Brazilian(ist) audience but of other scholars concerned with global processes and global history.

Notas

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[2] Exceptions to this rule come largely from Anglophone scholars. See, for instance: Manchester, Alan K., *The Transfer of the Court to Brazil*, in: Henry H. Keith/S. F. Edwards (eds.), *Conflict and Continuity in Brazilian Society*, Columbia 1969, p. 148–190; Schultz, Kirsten, *Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy, and the Portuguese Royal Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1821*, New York 2001.

[3] Christopher Bayly refers to the first “global crisis” (1780–1820) as the “age of archaic globalization”, Bayly, Christopher, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914. Global Connections and Comparisons*, Oxford 2004.

[4] See, for instance, Elliot, John Huxtable, *Empires of the Atlantic World. Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830*, New Haven, Conn./London 2007; Maier, Charles S., *Among Empires: American ascendancy and its predecessors*, Cambridge 2006.

[5] A. J. R. Russell-Wood makes an analysis up to the decisive year 1808: Russell-Wood, A. J. R., Centers and peripheries in the Luso-Brazilian World, 1500–1808, in: Daniels, Christine (ed.), Negotiated empires: centers and peripheries in the Americas, New York et al. 2002, pp. 105–142.

[6] For an orientation in the field of global history see, for example, Sachsenmaier, Dominic, Global perspectives on global history: theories and approaches in a connected world, Cambridge et al. 2011; Bentley, Jerry H. (ed.), The Oxford handbook of world history, Oxford et al., 2011; Conrad, Sebastian(ed.), Globalgeschichte. Theorien, Ansätze, Themen, Frankfurt et al. 2007.

[7] My PhD thesis “transfer et impera. Die Verlegung des portugiesischen Königshofes nach Brasilien: Polizei und Regierung in Zeiten der globalen Krise (1808-1821)” originated during my work in the Research Training Group “Critical Junctures of Globalisation” (funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [DFG]) at the University of Leipzig. My thesis will be published by Böhlau (Köln/Weimar/Wien) probably in autumn 2013.

[8] Jurandir Malerba counted 453 monographs published about Brazilian independence until 2006, not including general histories of Brazil that usually also treat the transfer of the Court, Malerba, Jurandir, Esboço crítico da recente historiografia sobre a independência do Brasil (c. 1980–2002), in: idem (ed.), A Independência do Brasil. Novas Dimensões, Rio de Janeiro 2006, pp. 19–52, p. 21.

[9] In the original version of my PhD thesis I included a chapter on the historiography of the transfer of about 40 pages.

[10] Reis, José Carlos, As identidades do Brasil: de Varnhagen a FHC, Rio de Janeiro 1999, p. 23.

[11] Varnhagen, Francisco Adolfo de, História geral do Brasil Vol. 5, São Paulo 1975 [first published in 1854], p. 34.

[12] Costa, Wilma Peres, A Independência na historiografia brasileira, in: István Jancsó (ed.), Independência: História e historiografia, São Paulo 2005, pp. 53–118, p. 59.

- [13] Silva, Maria Beatriz Nizza da, D. João. Príncipe e Rei no Brasil, Lisbon 2008, p. 108; The classical work by Manuel de Oliveira Lima, amongst many others, connected the transfer of the court to territorial unity, independence and the emergence (or consolidation) of a nation: Lima, Manuel de Oliveira, D. João VI no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro 2006 [first published in 1908]. In the 1960s and 1970s there were published accounts that linked the transfer to “modernity” and “emancipation”: Pondé, Francisco de Paula e Azevedo, D. João VI e a emancipação intelectual do Brasil, in: RIHGB 279, 1968, S. 114–135; Reis, Artur César Ferreira, D. João e os primórdios da Modernidade Brasileira, in: Ocidente. Nova série 80/396, 1971, pp. 277–288.
- [14] Carvalho, José Murilo de, D. João e as histórias dos Brasis, in: RBH 28/56, 2008, pp. 551–572, p. 555.
- [15] Diário de Notícias, November 29th, 2007.
- [16] Araújo, Ana Cristina, Revoltas e ideologias em conflito durante as Invasões Francesas, in: Revista de História das Ideias 7, Coimbra 1985, pp. 7–90, p. 15.
- [17] Guimarães, Jucia Maria Paschoal, A Historiografia e a Transferência da Corte portuguesa para o Brasil, in: RIHGB 168/436, 2007, pp. 15–28, p. 21.
- [18] “[E]nquanto em Portugal continuava a guerra e definhavam as atividades econômicas, o Brasil, em cuja capital se encontrava fixada a sede da monarquia [...] caminhava a passos largos para a independência, pelo alento indireto que a estada da corte imprimiu a tal processus”, Serrão, Joel, Art. “Regeneração”, in: Dicionário da História de Portugal, Vol. 3, Lisbon 1968, pp. 552–558.
- [19] One of the most important Portuguese historians of the 19th century, Joaquim Pedro de Oliveira Martins (1854–1894), painted a very critical and satirical picture of the monarch, Oliveira Martins, História de Portugal, Lisbon: Antonio Maria Pereira 1880, p. 260f.
- [20] Marques, A.H. de Oliveira, D. João VI, in: D. João VI e o seu tempo, Lissabon 1998, p. 29–45, p. 45.
- [21] Pedreira, Jorge M., From Growth to Collapse: Portugal, Brazil, and the Breakdown of the Old Colonial System (1760–1830), in: HAHR 80/4, 2000, pp. 839–864, p. 839.

- [22] Secco, Lincoln, A „Revolução Liberal“: o Império português da Abertura dos Portos à Regeneração (1808–1851), in: Oliveira, Luís Valente de/Rubens Ricupero (eds.), A Abertura dos Portos, São Paulo 2007, pp. 196–219, p. 204.
- [23] Fernández Sebastián, Javier, Algumas notas sobre história conceptual e sobre a sua aplicação ao espaço atlântico ibero-americano, in: Ler História 55, 2008, pp. 5–15, p. 5.
- [24] Cooper, Frederick, Colonialism in Question. Theory, Knowledge, History, Berkeley, Ca. 2005, p. 200.
- [25] Schwarcz, Lilia Moritz, Um Debate com Richard Graham ou „com Estado mas sem Nação: O modelo imperial Brasileiro de Fazer Política“, in: Diálogos. Revista do Departamento de História da Universidade Estadual de Maringá 5/1, 2001, pp. 53–74, p. 57.
- [26] Ringrose, David R., Capital Cities and their Hinterlands: Europe and the Colonial Dimension, in: Clark, Peter/Bernard Lepetit (eds.), Capital cities and their Hinterlands in Early Modern Europe, Aldershot et al. 1996, pp. 217–240, p. 236.
- [27] According to Maria Fernanda Bicalho cities gave stability to the Portuguese empire that reached across four continents: Bicalho, Maria Fernanda, Cidades e elites coloniais. Redes de poder e negociação, in: Varia historia 29, 2003, pp. 17–38, p. 38.
- [28] As cited in: Kossok, Manfred, Revolution – Reform – Gegenrevolution in Spanien und Portugal (1808–1910), in: Middell, Matthias (ed.), Kossok. Ausgewählte Schriften Vol. 2, Leipzig 2000, pp. 47–70, p. 58.
- [29] According to A. J. R. Russell-Wood, port cities in Latin America were open and vulnerable to the “winds of change” from Europe and North-America, Russell-Wood, A. J. R., Ports of Colonial Brazil, in: F. W. Knight/P. K. Liss (eds.), Atlantic Port Cities: Economy, Culture and Society in the Atlantic World, 1690–1850, Knoxville 1991, pp. 196–239, p. 230.
- [30] Jacobs, Jane, Edge of Empire. Postcolonialism and the City, London/New York 1996, p. 21.

[31] See, among many others: Reinhard, Wolfgang, *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt. Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, München 1999, especially pp. 363ff; Landwehr, Achim, *Policey im Alltag: die Implementation frühneuzeitlicher Policeyordnungen in Leonberg, Frankfurt am Main* 2000.

[32] Foucault, Michel, *Sicherheit, Territorium, Bevölkerung* (Geschichte der Gouvernementalität vol. 1), Frankfurt a. M. 2006 (also available in English: Foucault, Michel, *Security, territory, population: lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, Basingstoke/Hampshire 2007).

[33] The Intendência Geral da Polícia was established on April 5, 1808, the Police Chief (Intendente Geral da Policia) was nominated on May 10, 1808.

[34] Macedo, Roberto, Paulo Fernandes Viana. *Administração do Primeiro Intendente-Geral da Polícia* (Pequenos Estudos sobre Grandes Administradores do Brasil), Rio de Janeiro 1956, p. 22. For general information about the Intendência Geral da Polícia see Silva, Maria Beatriz Nizza da, *A Intendência-Geral da Polícia: 1808–1821*, in: *Acervo* 1/2, 1986, S. 187-204, p. 187.

[35] Holloway, Thomas Halsey, *Policing Rio de Janeiro. Repression and resistance in a 19th-century city*, Stanford 1993, p. 32.

[36] Macedo, Paulo Fernandes Vianna, p. 27.

[37] There are many studies of this period based on the police documents. Most of them deal with internal societal struggle. See Algranti, Leila Mezan, *Os registros da polícia e seu aproveitamento para a história do Rio de Janeiro: Escravos e libertos*, in: *Revista de história* 119, 1985–1988, pp. 115–125.

[38] Viana, Paulo Fernandes, *Abreviada Demonstração dos Trabalhos da Policia em todo o Tempo que a servio o Dezembargador do Paço* Paulo Fernandes Viana, in: *RIHGB* 55/1, 1892, pp. 373-380. p. 379f.

[39] Police intendant Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro, July 30th, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte cód. 323 vol. 3, S. 60-60v.

[40] Police intendant Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro, January 6, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte cód. 323 vol. 3, p. 7v.; Officio by police intendant Vianna to the embassador of Sweden, Agostinho Hoffman, Rio de Janeiro, October 14, 1809, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 1, p. 152.

[41] Paulo Fernandes Vianna, Rio de Janeiro, May 30, 1809, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 1, p. 85-85v.

[42] “[Ele foi preso...] por constar conversações indiscretas que na sua botica tinha com louvor e regozijo do que se passava em Buenos Aires, cujo sistema nem por nós, nem por algum vassalo honrado de qualquer nação que seja, pode ser louvado.” Police intendant Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro, June 17, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte cód. 323 vol. 3, S. 54–54v. “[E]lle he bem suspeitozo de folgar aqui com as revoluçoens de Boenos-Aires, de espalhar as notícias dali, gostando de se entreter em conversaçoes”. Vianna to Linhares, Rio de Janeiro, August 12, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte cód. 323 vol. 3, pp. 63v–64. See also Silva, A Intendência-Geral da Polícia, p. 190.

[43] Schultz, Tropical Versailles, p. 128.

[44] Plano de melhoramento geral do estabelecimento da Polícia do Reino do Brasil, que apresenta o Intendente Geral Paulo Fernandes Viana, e a que serve de demonstração a representação que o acompanha na data de 24 de Novembro de 1816, police intendant Vianna to the King D. João VI, Rio de Janeiro, November 24, 1816, ANRJ Diversos GIF1 6J–83.

[45] Meißner, Jochen/Ulrich Mücke/Klaus Weber, Schwarzes Amerika. Eine Geschichte der Sklaverei, Munich 2008, p. 159.

[46] Police intendant Vianna to the minister of state, Villanova Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, November 12, 1818, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 Vol. 5, S. 71v-72.

[47] Police intendant Vianna to Villanova Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, November 16, 1818, ANRJ Polícia da Corte, Cód. 323 Vol. 5, pp. 72–74.

[48] Police intendant Vianna to King D. João VI, Rio de Janeiro, November 16, 1818, ANRJ Cód. 323 Vol. 5, pp. 80–81v.

[49] Cooper, Frederick, *Colonialism in Question. Theory, Knowledge, History*, Berkeley, Calif. 2005, S. 200f.

[50] The number varied over the years, mostly three to six.

[51] Lousada, Maria Alexandre, *Public Space and Popular Sociability in Lisbon in the Early Nineteenth Century*, in: *Santa Barbara Portuguese Studies* 4, 1997, pp. 219–232, p. 223; Lousada, Maria Alexandre, *A cidade vigiada. A polícia e a cidade de Lisboa no início do século XIX*, in: *Cadernos de Geografia* 17, 1997, S. 227–232, S. 228.

[52] Lousada, Maria Alexandre, *Espaços de sociabilidade em Lisboa finais do século XVIII a 1834*, Lisbon 1995, p. 76.

[53] Ilha Terceira is one of the bigger islands in the Azores archipelago, in the middle of the North Atlantic Ocean. It was the location of the historical capital of the archipelago. Due to its geostrategic position, Terceira played a crucial role in the construction of the Portuguese empire.

[54] See, for example, Police intendant Lucas Seabra Silva to Visconde da Anadia, Lisbon, December 10, 1808, IAN/TT, Intendencia Geral da Policia, Livro 10, p. 30v.

[55] Police intendant Silva to the Visconde da Anadia, Lisbon, November 13, 1808, IAN/TT, Intendencia Geral da Policia Livro 9, f. 110. Idem to idem, Novembre 25, 1808, IAN/TT, Intendencia Geral da Polícia Livro 10, p. 17.

[56] The Constitution of Cádiz was established on March 19, 1812, by the first national sovereign assembly, the Cortes Generales (“General Courts”) of Spain. This constitution was one of the most liberal of its time.

[57] After an intensive debate in the 1990s, the term “absolutist” is usually not used by German historians anymore, for it misleadingly suggests that the power of the monarch was absolute, cf. Freist, Dagmar, *Absolutismus*, Darmstadt 2008, p. 113. In Portuguese publications, however, the term is commonly used and mostly refers to a certain time span.

[58] Jelavich, Peter, Methode? Welche Methode? Bekenntnisse eines gescheiterten Strukturalisten, in: Christoph Conrad/Martina Kessel (eds.), Kultur & Geschichte. Neue Einblicke in eine alte Beziehung, Stuttgart 1998, pp. 141–159, p. 151f.