THE KANTIAN CONCEPTION OF THE CAPACITY OF THE WILL

Abstract

The general aim of the present work is to analyze the Kantian conception of the capacity of Willkür, as defined from the distinction with Wille, which in the context of this distinction can be identified with pure practical reason. The specific aim is to propose a clarification of the possibility of morally bad actions, described as actions that are freely produced by Willkür, but that are in disagreement with the law of freedom established by Wille. The guiding hypothesis of the proposed clarification is that Willkür should not be understood as a power of free choice, of which morally bad actions would be manifestations, but should be understood as a power to intend, try and actually fulfill the moral law established by Wille, which implies that morally evil actions manifest, not the power of Willkür, but a state of relative impotence, or diminution of its original power, into which it falls by inattention, not by choice, and from which it it can recover thanks to the continuous legislating activity of Wille.