Gaslighting como violência gramatical: uma leitura baseada na epistemologia wittgensteiniana

Abstract

Gaslighting can be understood as a type of manipulation in which the victim is led to doubt their own most basic perceptions and experiences, and consequently, their sanity. To comprehend the nature of the doubt that arises in victims of gaslighting, Trächtler (2022) seeks to explain how someone can be driven to despair by being manipulated into systematically questioning themselves about such fundamental aspects of their own life. To this end, the author presents a conceptualization of gaslighting as a form of epistemic injustice, following Fricker (2007). Aligned with this, and drawing on epistemological reflections inspired by Wittgenstein's posthumous work “On Certainty” (1969), Trächtler also provides a detailed discussion on the nature of our practices of doubt.  Here, we argue, like Trächtler, that the self-questioning inherent in the practice of gaslighting indeed violates the boundaries of our everyday language games. However, we consider it inconsistent to interpret the harm caused by this practice as primarily affecting the epistemic domain of the victim. In this sense, also inspired by Wittgenstein (1969), we argue that the phenomenon of gaslighting should be more appropriately conceptualized as a form of grammatical violence. Gaslighting should therefore be understood as primarily a grammatical attack, in the Wittgensteinian sense of the term grammar, rather than an epistemological one. Based on this conceptualization, we explore the implications of what we call grammatical violence and propose a possible way of resisting gaslighting grammatically as well.