“FALAR MENOS, VIVER MAIS”: A CONSTITUIÇÃO DO SUJEITO ARISTOCRÁTICO NO DISCURSO ESTOICO

Abstract

This article analyzes the injunctivity in Epictetus’s Encheiridion to trace the
formation rules of the aristocratic subject-position within Stoic discourse. The constitution of the
aristocratic subject implies a juxtaposition between a philosophy of formation, as seen in
Stoicism, and a critical philosophy, characteristic of modernity. While the former focuses on duty,
economy, and intramundane asceticism, the latter, which shaped the democratic subject, is based
on will, freedom of expression, and rights. Furthermore, while democracy is associated with
rhetoric and judicialization, timocracy and Stoicism value the economy of words and duty.
Through the analysis of discendi verbs in the imperative mood, Stoic discourse in general, and
Epictetus’s Encheiridion in particular, reconcile philosophy and religion. This reconciliation
results in an ethics of silence and self-mastery for self-care. The injunction, far from being
imposed, functions as advice for the formation of an abstemious and rational subject regarding
the use of words, contrasting with the typical expressiveness of citizens shaped by democratic
beliefs.