CONFUSÃO, DISTINÇÃO E EXPRESSÃO

TRÊS CHAVES PARA ABORDAR QUALIDADES SENSÍVEIS EM LEIBNIZ

Abstract

Since the emergence of Modernity and the consolidation of a mechanistic view of nature, a new differentiation was introduced between two types of properties attributed to bodies. Every physical event can be explained exclusively in terms of impacts between bodies in motion, to the extent that the nature of the physical world is reduced to material bodies to which only qualities such as size, shape, position and movement are attributed. In this way, mechanical properties, which John Locke would call primary properties, are often considered real properties present in bodies, while qualities such as color, heat and taste (defined as secondary properties) become ontologically and epistemologically problematic, giving rise to a series of debates about the proper functioning of the senses, the nature of the mental representations they produce and their cognitive value. This debate, which runs through much of modern thought, also concerns Leibniz, although in his case the issue falls within the framework of more complex metaphysics. In this paper, we propose to examine Leibniz’s conception of sensible qualities through the analysis of three of its essential dimensions: its confused nature, its possible distinction and its expressive character.