A RECUSA DE SARTRE AO EU PENSO DE KANT

Authors

  • Marcos Rabelo Universidade Federal de Sergipe

Abstract

The Essay on the Transcendence of the Ego" begins with Jean-Paul Sartre's (1905-1980) stance on the impossibility of adopting the concept of "I think," as formulated by Kant. In this regard, the present article aims to present some of the justifications that led Sartre to reject the concept of "I think" in the way it was formulated by critical philosophy. In order to achieve this objective, the article seeks to present the way in which Kant formulated his concept of “I think.” In the first part, we seek to revisit some key arguments in order to understand why Kant concluded that it was necessary to postulate this concept. In the second part, Sartre's justification is examined, according to which it is not possible to revisit Kant due to the objective of the investigation leading to a field entirely distinct from that of critical philosophy. To the extent that The Transcendence of the Ego seeks to render consciousness a pure immanence, devoid of any content, Kant’s “I think” becomes incompatible with this definition.

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Published

2026-02-21