CONTRA A DOUTRINA DO JUÍZO

Abstract

Deleuze proposes a radical critique of the doctrine of judgment, which he identifies as a central mechanism in the tradition of Western philosophy. To judge is to submit, classify, impose forms and purposes from an exterior instance to the event. Judgment is a kind of tribunal that domesticates thought, life, and desire. For Deleuze, judgment serves morality, representation, and transcendence. From the Greeks to the present day, it functions as a control device: of time, the body, and language. It prevents becoming, blocks difference and nullifies experimentation. To end judgment is to open space for an affirmative thought, one that does not judge but creates. A thought that arises from immanence and is guided by immanent criteria, not by external values. Deleuze calls upon figures like Artaud, Nietzsche, D.H. Lawrence, and Kafka as producers of forces that break with judgment and establish other logics— logics of the outside, excess, and difference. Abolishing judgment is also about abolishing the subject as a stable center and time as an ordered succession. In place of judgment, Deleuze proposes an ethics of experimentation: a life without tribunal, without imposed forms, where each event is evaluated by its potential for transformation. To philosophize, then, is to create lines of escape—not sentences.