A NOÇÃO DE BEATITUDE EM TOMÁS DE AQUINO

Abstract

This article analyzes the notion of beatitude in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, focusing on questions II and III of the Prima Secundae (I-II) of the Summa Theologiae. The investigation explores how the medieval philosopher articulates the influences of Aristotle and Augustine to define happiness not merely as an emotional state, but as the ordering of rational acts toward an ultimate end. Initially, the nature of the Supreme Good is discussed, identified as God, the only object capable of fully satisfying the human will, which possesses an intrinsic longing for the infinite. The work distinguishes beatitude under two aspects: as an uncreated object (God) and as the act of possession or enjoyment of this object by the creature (a created act of the rational soul). Subsequently, the anthropological dimension is addressed, analyzing the relationship between the soul and the goods of the body. Although Aquinas does not reject human animality and recognizes the importance of health and the senses, he establishes a clear hierarchy where bodily goods are instrumental and subordinate to the goods of the soul. It is argued that, since the body exists for the soul, the conservation of the physical being cannot constitute man’s ultimate end. It concludes that beatitude, for Aquinatae, consists of a perfect act of the intellect — contemplation — which allows man to participate in the divine essence. This perspective offers pathways for ethics and psychology by explaining human restlessness in the face of finite goods and the need to direct desires toward the supreme good.