ENTRE A FÍSICA E A METAFÍSICA: MOVIMENTO, CAUSALIDADE E PRIMEIRO PRINCÍPIO EM ARISTÓTELES E TOMÁS DE AQUINO

Authors

  • Luana de Souza Nascimento Universidade Federal de Sergipe

Abstract

This article investigates the notion of motion as a principle of intelligibility of natural philosophy in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, analyzing how the investigation of the mobile being leads to the limits of physical explanation and requires recourse to metaphysics. The study begins with the Aristotelian definition of motion as the actuality of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency, as well as with the causal structure grounded in the relation between act and potency, mover and moved. Through an analysis of Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, it is demonstrated that the explanation of motion implies the necessity of a first unmoved mover, conceived as the foundation of the eternity and continuity of the cosmos. The article then examines the Thomistic reception of this problem, especially in the Summa Theologiae, the Summa contra Gentiles, the Commentary on the Physics, and the De substantiis separatis. The study shows that Thomas preserves the Aristotelian argumentative structure while reinserting the analysis of motion into a broader metaphysical horizon, in which the first mover is understood not only as the cause of motion, but also as the cause of the very being of entities. It seeks to demonstrate, therefore, that the way of motion simultaneously constitutes an investigation into the nature of the mobile being and a rational path of ascent toward the first principle. It concludes that motion functions as a point of articulation between physics and metaphysics, revealing the internal limits of natural philosophy and its necessary openness to the investigation of being qua being.

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Published

2026-07-23